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Abstract
The League of Nations’ effectiveness as a bureaucratic body has been hotly contested.
Almost since its founding, critics of the League viewed its humanitarian and peacekeeping
missions as failures. This thesis reevaluates these criticisms by studying the League’s work on
behalf of refugees from Germany from the end of 1935 up through the Second World War. The
thesis focuses on the activities of the League after James G. McDonald, High Commissioner for
Refugees Coming from Germany, resigned in December of 1935 and during the time the
Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees (ICR) began its work on the issue of refugees fleeing
from Nazi expansion. The thesis illustrates the limited options and complications League
officials confronted while dealing with the severity of European migrations initiated by National
Socialist persecution of Jews and political enemies of the Third Reich. It fills a gap in our
understanding of League efforts to address the escalating problem of refugee protection. Some of
the most important works of the League included its efforts to ease the difficulties faced by
refugees coming from Germany, the Saar region, Austria, the Sudetenland, Poland and
eventually all of Europe. This thesis shows that such works illustrate the potentials the League
had when it came to encountering the question of refugees. It also argues that the League should
be reassessed as an organization for refugee assistance and minority protection because it
demonstrates that once the ICR emerged as an institution, the League did not halt its operations.
Instead, the following thesis shows that the League’s refugee works during the war helped the
ICR to contribute to what the League started doing as an organization, and that was ensuring
minorities and refugees their place within the global community.
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Introduction
After World War I, most of Europe finally entered an era of peace and diplomacy. But
with defeat of the Central Powers brought another issue on the horizon – the treatment of
minority refugees across Europe. World War I left Europe in ruins. National economies were
devastated; populations became victims of war-torn, impoverished areas. Those that were
negatively impacted by the war were a number of displaced individuals. In an effort to ensure
that the world would not enter another deadly conflict, American President Woodrow Wilson
and fellow internationalists envisioned the establishment of a global institution that could resolve
disputes and help promote international cooperation through diplomatic measures.
Wilson’s Fourteen Points eventually came to life, as the Paris Peace Conference would
lead to the official creation of the League of Nations on January 10, 1920. Despite Wilson’s
optimism for the international project outlined in the League Covenant, the United States
Congress did not ratify the Versailles Treaty, thus maintaining an initial low profile for America
in global affairs.1 Many European advocates of the League, on the other hand, believed that the
League could serve as a positive agent for bringing rehabilitation to individuals that fell victim to
the war’s economic deprivations and social hardships.
Throughout the interwar period, the League would find itself dealing with questions on
the status of minorities. The issue of minority protection arose during the onslaught of the
Russian Civil War and when the League was reconstructing Europe’s political order. Russia’s
internal chaos had caused millions of people to migrate out of the former empire, while minority
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populations were demanding political sovereignty within the areas that once belonged to the
Central Powers.2 The interwar period witnessed initial successes in its duties to assist minority
populations and refugees, such as the signing of the Polish Minorities Treaty and the creation of
the Nansen passport. Such efforts by the League minimized territorial disputes from escalating
into large-scale conflict and were improving the lives of those that had lost their homes and
livelihoods.3 However, such successes did have its limits since the League as a whole, especially
the British and French, were having difficulties adapting to the new state system in order to deal
with minority appeals.
Europe then would experience a renewed immigration crisis, after the National Socialists
gained power in Germany in 1933. With Adolf Hitler sworn in as Germany’s new chancellor,
many German Jews were stripped of their national status, which resulted in many of these
formerly nationalized Jews being denied access to political rights, economic benefits, and social
safety nets.4 These pressures on the Jewish community not only encouraged Jewish emigration,
but they created a new challenge for the League. In response to the Nazis’ discriminatory acts
against German Jewish refugees, the League created the High Commission for Refugees (Jewish
and Other) Coming from Germany so that it could cooperate with governments to create
resolutions that would provide financial means of assistance. In order for this High Commission
to assist minorities, national governments would have had to willingly ease their immigration
restrictions and authorize exceptions so that foreigners could participate in the labor force and
gain access to hospitality and housing.5 James Grover McDonald, an American politician, was

George Ginsburgs, “The Soviet Union and the Problem of Refugees and Displaced Persons 1917- 1956,” The
American Journal of International Law 51, no. 2 (1957), 326.
3
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4
Greg Burgess, The League of Nations and the Refugees from Nazi Germany: James G. McDonald and Hitler's
Victims, (India: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 161.
5
Burgess, Refugees from Nazi Germany, 51.
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appointed Chairman of the High Commission in the hopes that an American public figure such
as McDonald could encourage US leaders and Jewish organizations to help raise awareness of
the humanitarian crisis and promote necessary steps for the League to aid impoverished
minorities in Germany.6
Greg Burgess has published a book on McDonald as the chairman of the High
Commission and the League’s refugee works in Germany. Burgess makes the case that the
League had failed to provide humanitarian relief to refugees trapped in Hitler’s Germany.
However, historians do not fully understand the nature of the League High Commission after
McDonald’s departure in December of 1935, just months after the Nazis’ promulgation of the
infamous Nuremberg Laws. Germany’s escalating persecution of Jews would test how effective
League diplomacy could be in responding to a state that did not abide by international norms.
While it is true that the League’s efforts ultimately failed, it needs to be remembered the policies
they attempted to implement and the reasons why they failed tell us much about the possibilities
and limits of internationalism in the late interwar period. This thesis brings to light the activities
of the League after McDonald resigned as acting High Commissioner and intends to demonstrate
how the League’s philosophy and practice limited its approach to resolving minority
mistreatment in Nazi Germany.
Furthermore, my thesis questions the conventional wisdom that the League failed due to
lack of American involvement. As Burgess suggests, it seems that the American High
Commissioner McDonald had tremendous potential in formulating League refugee policy,
especially when his resignation letter provided a basis as to why the moral problem of refugees
could not be resolved and how the League could move forward in embracing the moral

6
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implications of refugee sufferings.7 But Burgess also asserts that the League ultimately failed
once America withdrew its support from the High Commission. By contrast, I question the
primacy of the American-led Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees (ICR) by comparing it
to the League’s reformed High Commission on Refugees that began operation in 1936, and argue
that it was not 1938, but rather 1943, when the ICR took leadership of the refugee crisis.

League of Nations
Established during the Paris Peace Conference on January 10, 1920, the League was the first
global bureaucratic body to ensure peace and cooperation among all nations. Within its covenant,
the League defined peace broadly to include international cooperation to solve social problems
that transcended state boundaries. To gain a better understanding on such outlined functions and
responsibilities, it is best to raise the introduction section of the League Covenant. It states:
In order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace
and security by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, by the
prescription of open, just, and honorable relations between nations, by the firm
establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of
conduct among Governments, and by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous
respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organized peoples with one
another…8.
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This passage illustrates what the League intended to accomplish, which was to
internationalize the role of governance. Internationalizing political conduct would in effect
enable states to address and respond to issues that required intergovernmental action. Such ideals
were a response to the devastating effects of World War I, which left many minority groups
within the collapsed empires no options for settlement, employment, and access to social
services. Due to the large number of refugees that were impacted by Europe’s instable and wartorn situation, while also determining the boundaries for Europe’s post-war order, the League
created organizations to provide aid for refugees. One of the institutions formed by the League
was called the Nansen International Office for Refugees, established in 1930 after the death of
Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.9 This institution
would provide relief to a number of refugee groups that appealed for minority protection or
wanted to escape domestic disputes over sovereign rights. After the Nazis came to power in
1933, the League would establish a High Commission to deal with refugees from Germany.
However, unlike the Nansen Office, this institution would not be formally part of the League
structure, and fellow American McDonald assumed the role of High Commissioner. He would
resign his post in 1935 and was replaced by Sir Neil Malcom.10
As Nazism’s expansion further complicated the League’s progress in addressing the
German refugee question, it was decided that the Nansen and High Commission offices would be
liquidated and merged into a single refugee organization, headed by Sir Herbert Emerson.
Shortly after the emergence of this new League High Commission for Refugees, the ICR was
also developed which pledged itself to oversee the broad issue of refugees.11 The establishment
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of the ICR is often seen as the birth of the modern refugee structure. However, by going through
the diplomatic history of the League after 1935, this thesis will show that the League remained
involved in refugee relief, and that its efforts is what contributed the ICR to formulate policies on
refugee issues.
What follows next is a section on the historical discussion of the League’s performance
as a global body. One of the historiographical issues regarding the League is its success or
effectiveness in approaching refugee grievances and needs. As the following section will
demonstrate, historians are at odds with another about this issue. Nevertheless, the vast
scholarship on the League will provide a general sense of what some historians have identified as
the pros and cons of the League’s experience dealing with the legal and humanitarian challenges
for refugees.

Historiography
Historians have taken an interest in both assessing the effectiveness of the League’s
performance, as well as putting the League in a wider context of “internationalism.” Even though
the League was not successful in providing the humanitarian aid Jewish refugees needed, their
works demonstrate that League officials were advocating for greater cooperation among states on
behalf of stateless peoples. One example of such works is Daniel Gorman’s book. He proposes
that during the interwar period, as different interpretations of how states should approach issues
on nationality and citizenship emerged, international-minded statesmen and activists saw the
significance of politics, culture, and even sports as a means of connecting with peers outside
their borders. Such examples Gorman uses are the Empire Games and the League’s 1921
Convention on the Traffic in Women and Children. The Empire Games, according to Gorman, is an
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excellent example where we see how leading members of the League, particularly Britain,
helped develop what he calls “an international society” through the notion of cultural
commonalities.12 Instances like the 1921 Convention on the Traffic in Women and Children
fundamentally changed the way the British Empire was treating the issue of human trafficking.13
This dense volume suggests that the League played an important part in stressing this notion of
greater cooperation among all nations. However, such an emphasis was achievable through the
cooperation and understanding among state and non-state actors, as well as non-Western and
European societies.
Other historians such as Keith D. Watenpaugh support this claim that the theory and
practice of international humanitarianism changed around the time of the League’s formation. In
his article, Watenpaugh reminds us that the framers and sympathizers of the League envisioned it
to be a permanent, international institution that would understand, address, and resolve the root
causes of human suffering.14 Examining the League’s rescue efforts in what we now call the
Armenian Genocide of 1915, he argues that private associations’ rescue Armenian survivors of
Ottoman violence had inspired a sense of commitment among the League’s decision-makers to
provide assistance for those devastated by the Ottoman-conducted genocide.15 The Armenian
project offers an example on some of the League’s functions pertaining to helping minorities that
had been impacted by imperialist rule.
Some historians have not shared Gorman’s optimism that the League served as a positive
agent for change. One example is Susan Pederson, who has recently published a book on the
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works of the League’s mandate system. She finds the mandate system guided by “imperial
internationalization” as opposed to state individuality.16 In other words, the mandate system, in
the view of Pedersen, had only reinforced imperial meanings of ethnic, religious, and other social
and cultural divisions. One example she offers is Belgium’s decision to stir up ethnic divisions in
order to regulate the laboring industries in Rwanda and Burundi.17 Such reorganizations of
Rwanda and Burundi’s economic systems are examples that undermined the League trying to
improve the status of minorities. Instead, it demonstrated that the League’s mandate system only
made it more “burdensome” for colonial populations as they were forced to face discriminatory
measures of social/economic supervision under major League members.18
Scholars have also discussed the League’s treatment of the issue of sovereign rights.
Historians such as Carole Fink provide such legal and ideological insights when referring to the
territorial issue between Poland and Ukraine during the final stages of the Great War. As the
Habsburg Monarchy was moving closer to accepting surrender terms, the Polish Liquidation
Commission had intentions of claiming the entire Galician region as part of the newly born
Polish state.19 However, when the Ruthenian National Council claimed the eastern sector of
Galicia as part of Ukraine, local Poles were outraged at their leaders for allowing the Ukrainians
to extend its sovereign claims. This conflict became so intensive that it had not only sparked an
ethnic conflict between Poles and Ukrainians, but also when the issue was brought to the
victorious Allies for support, they could not reach a consensus. France had recognized Poland’s
claim of allowing Galicia to be part of Polish sovereignty, while Britain threatened that if they
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saw any form of expansion from Poland in the East, it would be met with swift resistance.20
Fink’s analysis on the Ukrainian-Polish dispute over Galicia illustrates how the League dealt
with the early question of minority protection. When the League began operation, it faced an era
in which sovereignty was judged through the basis of imperial claim, and if absolutely need be,
conflict. The idea of an intergovernmental body such as the League raising the issue of sovereign
rights and redefining the boundaries of national belonging was an initial challenge for European
officials to understand when fulfilling its obligations towards minority rights and refugee
protection.
Another historian by the name of Mira Siegelberg has recently published a book about
the legal status of stateless people in the early 20th century. A key argument that she presents is
how the rise of fascism and Nazism caused more issues for liberal positivists to promote the idea
that the sovereign territorial state should not be emphasized as the fundamental source of
protection and rights. Rather, all individuals, including those that lacked membership in a
sovereign community, should obtain the same access of protection and rights as national citizens.
As she states throughout her study, the era of imperial internationalism had claimed the right to
interject the meaning of state status, which was that ethnicity played an essential component in
gaining citizenship to the state.21 In this sense, Siegelberg’s main contribution to the historical
discussion in understanding the League’s hesitation in addressing minority issues involves
understanding how League officials were accustomed to 19th century interpretations of
nationality. Due to this inclination of needing national membership to gain access to political
representation, safety nets, and economic benefits, it made League officials unprepared to
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understand the legal challenges that were presented when the issue of stateless minorities
emerged.
Some historians have emphasized that members of what Gorman describes as
“international society” were making similar collaborative efforts towards international
humanitarianism during the timeframe under present consideration. A great example is the
collaborative work of Laura E. Brade and Rose Holmes, as they bring attention to a new
prominent figure that seemed to take McDonald’s work to the next level. While they do not
mention anything about McDonald, they acknowledge a man by the name of Nicholas Winton,
who took a leading role in the Kindertransports, which was rescuing and providing housing for
669 children, along with around 15,000 other refugees supported by the Czech Refugee Trust
Fund, out of Czechoslovakia between 1939 and 1940.22 Brade and Holmes believe not only
Winton’s leading role in promoting collaborative and international humanitarianism should be
remembered, but that the work conducted here marked a new beginning for global relations. This
global humanitarian effort brought together several organizations to assist the refugees in
Czechoslovakia.
When focusing on the refugee crisis in Nazi Germany, there are some historians who
have transitioned to focusing on populist efforts in raising the refugee crisis. In other words,
historians have emphasized how private organizations publicized the issue of refugees and urged
their national governments to reexamine their options to help those that were in need of
treatment. Such an example is that of Haim Genizi who brings to light the efforts made by
individual Christians and Christian organizations within the United States in changing the
attitudes of the Roosevelt Administration and the American people. In particular, Genizi seems
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to suggest that the efforts of these Christian societies are what encouraged McDonald to press for
new approaches in trying to resolve the refugee problem.23 Genizi’s article provides clarity as to
why McDonald was still determined in trying to provide humanitarian aid when he faced
formidable political opposition.
Scholars’ understanding of the refugee crisis as a fundamental humanitarian problem has
expanded, especially when considering the efforts of non-elite activists. While historians such as
Genizi have emphasized the efforts of evangelical institutions within the United States, there are
some historians who have acknowledged joint efforts among several countries in raising
emphasis and trying to provide humanitarian assistance to Jewish refugees shortly before the
start of the Second World War. Among those historians is Astrid Zajdband, whose book chapter
accomplishes two things when stressing the significance of populist actors playing a role in
pressing the issue of refugee humanitarian needs and making efforts so that refugees had access
to such resources. Her chapter narrates the rescue schemes that were orchestrated both
independently and jointly between British and German Jewish organizations.24 While it is true
that the social, political, and cultural landscapes differed vastly between the two nations,
Zajdband suggests that since both Jewish communities were able to establish close personal and
professional relations with one another due to shared goals and concerns regarding the status of
Jewish individuals it enabled these rescues to be possible.
While there are historians who have emphasized the efforts made in acknowledging and
resolving the refugee issues in the years leading to World War II, some historians have discussed
the kinds of experiences and more specifically the adaptations Jewish communities had to
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embrace while waiting for assistance. Marion Kaplan’s book chapter is a perfect example of such
a perspective, as it uses cookbooks, memoirs, and even her mother’s recipe box, to demonstrate
the ways in which Jews adapted to food challenges while attempting to retain food customs in a
number of different cultural environments.25 While her work focuses on a broader timeframe,
which begins with the examination of German-Jewish foodways from the Imperial era (18711916), it offers detail on the varied food experiences refugees encountered as they remained in
Portugal en route to safer havens during the Nazi period (1933-1945).26 It also provides context
on the tiny refugee settlement in Sosua in the Dominican Republic and how Central European
Jews adapted to consume tropical foods. As Kaplan points out, such cooking experiences were
similar for refugees living in the United States.27 Kaplan’s work provides an interesting
perspective on the matter of providing humanitarian needs to the European Jewish refugees, as
something the existing scholarship has not explored are the tensions between what League and
non-League nations when it came to providing for the refugees and the tensions between food
customs of the refugees and those of their host countries.
Some scholars are beginning to pay more attention to the works of other global networks,
such as the Intergovernmental Committee on Refugees, as opposed to the League’s policies on
refugee relief. For instance, Tommie Sjöberg’s analysis on the creation and operation of this new
intergovernmental refugee organization suggests that the Intergovernmental Committee not only
operated separately from the League, but it would remain the main international refugee agency
until the United Nations created agencies to deal with the displaced peoples issue that emerged
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after World War II.28 This suggests that Sjöberg believes that the League no longer held a
position in formulating refugee policy. This academic work intends to challenge this notion, as
there is evidence that demonstrates the League was trying to resolve the practical complications
of resettling refugees from Germany, even as the Intergovernmental Committee started its work.
In what follows, I will provide context on how the refugee crisis in Europe after World
War I presented problems not just for the refugees themselves, but also for the decision-makers
of the League when trying to resolve the mistreatment of Jewish and non-Jewish refugees. In the
first chapter, it will focus on the diplomatic history of the League before the time of James G.
McDonald, Chairman of the High Commission for Refugees from Germany. Within this
investigation of the interwar period, I will provide a description of philosophical and practical
tensions European bureaucrats experienced when trying to resolve the challenges of immigration
after the First World War, thus illustrating how deeply-rooted the legal complications in
understanding statelessness complicated the League’s ability in being able to successfully
approach the German refugee crisis. I will also discuss the efforts of individuals who dealt with
refugees before the High Commission was needed, thus showing that McDonald was not the
only individual who understood the implications and called for steps to ensure a proper solution
to the refugee question.
The second section will then address the specific problem Nazi Germany raised regarding
the status and treatment of Jewish refugees. The issues that Nazism brought onto national
refugees that were relinquished of their citizenship will then be compared to the legal
justifications when the Nansen Passport was authorized through the Nansen International Office,
and how the German refugee crisis presented legal problems different from those handled by the
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Nansen Office. Such an analysis will provide explanations on why the Special Commission was
established separate from the Nansen Office for Refugees. Lastly, the third section will assess
League policies responding to the growing crisis in Germany when McDonald was no longer the
High Commissioner for German refugees. This part of the examination includes seeing the
League responding to the expansion of the Third Reich, namely the annexation of Hitler’s
homeland Austria, the Sudetenland, and shortly after the Nazi invasion of Poland. One purpose
of the assessment is to not only observe what the League did after McDonald stepped down as
Commissioner, but also whether or not if the League changed its methodologies in approaching
refugee stresses. It will also reference some of the works of the ICR to assess if it worked jointly
or separately from the League on refugee humanitarian needs. The other aspect of this
assessment will reveal what the League’s role was in handling refugee issues when the
Intergovernmental Committee emerged as another agency that sought to resolve the refugee
crisis.

20

Chapter 1: The League Before the Rise of National Socialism
Before discussing Germany’s refugee crisis in 1933, we need to understand how the
League approached minority protection during the interwar period. When dealing with the issue
of minority protection, League authorities believed that they were able to ensure the rights of
minorities through the basis of nationality laws in place by individual nation-states. However,
when the issue of statelessness, or individuals without a national status, converged with the
minority refugee question, the intersection of these two issues brought to light contradictions in
the League’s understanding of national belonging, citizenship, collective representation, and
rights. We will see here the philosophical and practical struggles that western diplomats were
dealing with in regard to the major immigration situation that emerged after World War I. These
struggles were more deeply rooted than some scholars may expect and are well illustrated by the
unique immigration case of Prussian businessman Max Stoeck, whose citizenship status
demonstrates how the Great War and its aftermath raised the issue of statelessness within
international politics.29
Stoeck’s case is well told by historian Mira Siegelburg in her study of statelessness. In
1896, Stoeck lost his citizenship status after leaving his homeland of Prussia and immigrating to
London. While Stoeck was living in Britain, the Prussian government revoked his citizenship,
but he did not naturalize himself as a legal subject of the British empire. This had dire
consequences for him when the Great War started, as the British government suspected Stoeck
was providing intelligence for the German Reich due to his continued relations with German
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peers through his electric-lamp corporation. After being denied English nationality by the British
government, this issue of national status was brought up to the Chancery Division of the English
High Court. In Stoeck v. Public Trustee, the court recognized Stoeck’s claims of losing national
membership from Germany but also ruled him as a person of “no nationality.”30 This ruling of
“statelessness” would complicate legal understandings of sovereignty and national membership,
for Stoeck was classified as an individual that had no official national belonging separate from
both the British and German sovereignties. It would lead to intensive disputes on the question of
the state’s role in regulating one’s sovereign belonging.
World War I brought significant changes to Europe’s social structures and its peoples.
Minority refugees were left with no means to afford housing and other safety nets since finances
from national governments were being used to compensate the property and personal losses of
national citizens. Relieving these post-war difficulties required intergovernmental action. The
postwar settlement made the nation-state as the dominant overseer of legal belonging. However,
there were two legal problems that emerged when the League tried to administer the political
boundaries of Europe’s post-war order.
First, there were tensions between governments who were not inclined to make decisions
on citizenship and nationhood for other states. The League had to find a balance between
ensuring stateless people were being sheltered and cared for, and how to determine one’s
belonging within a national sovereign. The second problem was that sovereign states were meant
to be organized along the lines of territorial boundaries. These territorial lines were meant to
represent the common cultural and/or national status of the population that was predominately
present within a designated state. The question of determining territorial boundaries for minority

30

Siegelberg, Statelessness, 12-13.

22
populations within ethnically rich areas was complicated since minority protection was heavily
contested among minority groups that had once belonged to the imperialist Central Powers.31
What will emerge from this chapter offers an analytical overview of the League’s
progress in dealing with minority and statelessness issues starting from its beginnings as an
international body to the early 1930’s. As part of going through the evolution of League minority
works, it will also describe the complications the League was experiencing when dealing with
this critical issue. Their first major test would be how it would respond to minority grievances
through their minority petition procedures. The chapter concludes with a consideration of the
League’s treatment of refugee crises and statelessness in the postwar period.

The League’s handling of Displaced Persons – Fridtjof Nansen and the League High
Commission for Refugees
Before delving into the League’s difficult handling of minority protection, the successes
of the League’s handling of displaced peoples from war-devastated regions should be
recognized. Such successes laid the groundword for how League officials undertook other
humanitarian issues. The League’s first conduct of humanitarian missions would regard the
status of individuals fleeing from the civil unrest that was occurring in the Soviet Union (USSR).
Through the October Revolution in 1917, Russia’s Provisional Government was overthrown by
the revolutionary Bolsheviks, establishing themselves as the new legitimate governing force in
the state. However, there were other political factions, particularly the Mensheviks, who did not
accept Bolshevik rule, thus resulting to a civil war.32
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Russia’s domestic crisis in turn resulted in several Russian individuals to flee westward,
in search for employment and settlement options. Many also did not have the proper
documentation to enter European states, thus leaving them no means of mobility to find better
living conditions. The status of Russian migrants worsened after the 1921 decree of the AllRussian Central Executive Committee and the Council of People’s Commissars, which deprived
Russian citizens legal protection from its national government for leaving the USSR without the
authorization of the Soviet Government. The Russians that had left during the Revolution were
considered stateless.33 To respond to the massive migration of refugees due to the intense
conditions of the Russian Revolution, the League created a High Commission for Refugees to
settle the issue. This commission would be led by its Commissioner Fridtjof Nansen, who
provided the refugees proper paperwork that guaranteed them the ability to cross international
borders, locate themselves in areas where settlement was feasible, and involve themselves in the
economies of numerous countries.34
The issuance of global travel documents for Russian refugees was then requested by
Nansen to be extended to Armenian refugees after reporting that approximately 320,000
Armenians were fleeing from a post-war Turkish government that was continuing the mass
persecutions of Armenian minorities in September 1923. These individuals either did not have
passports, or had documentation that had validity restrictions from Turkish or Allied authorities.
Through the Intergovernmental Arrangements of 1924 and 1926, the League adopted a
resolution that would extend the travel document provisions for Russian refugees over to the
Armenian refugees.35 Then, in December 1926, the League Council met to consider the
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extension of intergovernmental protection to other refugee groups that had been living under
“analogous conditions.”36 Between the years 1926 to 1928, Nansen continued to provide studies
and suggestions for groups that he felt should have been included under such considerations.
Nansen was able to convince the League to extend the travel provisions to another 155,000
consisting of seven more classes of refugees in June 1928.37 From this series of policies, they
illustrate that the League continually were urging for both the recognition and placement of
refugee status to be addressed not only as a political matter, but to place them as a legitimate part
of the global community. What next follows is an analysis on the League’s minority petition
system, and how a number of institutional considerations presented challenges for the League in
providing the same satisfactory services for mistreated minorities within Europe’s post-WWI
order.

The League’s Minority Petition System
Before World War I, minority protection was not emphasized as a crucial issue in the
arena of global politics. Even though the three main congresses during the nineteenth century,
Vienna (1814-15), Paris (1856), and Berlin (1878), had produced treaty provisions that pledged
the security and rights of all populations, the competitive interests of Europe’s imperial, warconcentrated sovereignties prevented such provisions from being enforced. However, after the
First World War, minority populations in Central and Eastern Europe were left vulnerable to the
post-war conditions, thus calling for immediate international action for assistance. Faced with
unemployment and a lack of social safety nets, minority groups hoped that through the Paris
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Peace Conference of 1919, the Great Powers would commit themselves to protecting minority
rights.
During this intergovernmental congress, the Allied Powers arranged agreements between
the new states (Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia) and the defeated powers (Austria,
Hungary, and Bulgaria) granting political and ethnic equality to the minority sectors of their
populations. The League then charged itself with enforcing these treaty obligations.38
Unfortunately, with this new international agency in charge over how states could “manage”
their populations created tensions over the role of international politics overseeing questions of
individual treatment. When it came to the old states defining their own legislation, states were
recognizing that they did not want to interfere with new states on the status of minorities.
Regarding treaty enforcement, there were limits on what the League could and would do to
protect minorities when some of the new states from Europe’s newly organized post-war order
were not following public expectations in protecting minorities. A minority petition system
would eventually emerge from this super-governmental authority so that minority grievances
could be heard.
Established in early 1920, this petition system was created for minorities to appeal to the
League if they were being mistreated by state officials. League framers were tasked with
ensuring that minorities within all states of post-war Europe were being granted the same
political rights as those of national citizens. However, League officials were aware of flaws
within the system that made it difficult for petitioners to file complaints and had intentions to
reform it. Unfortunately, they were reluctant to reform their minority system because they were
still inclined to not dictate the principles of national legislation and insisted that such matters
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were to be determined by individual states as opposed to an intergovernmental body.39 Also, the
minority treaty system, created by the Great Powers, gave collective rights to minority groups
within the former imperial regions that were too difficult to protect. Since the Allied Powers
assumed there would be an assimilation of minority protection with collectivism, they assumed
the question of minority status would not be an issue. This “assimilation thesis” is connected to
the Great Power’s “civilizing” intentions of its mandate system, which was that the dominant
culture of a proposed state would represent above the weaker cultures.40
Nevertheless, according to Carole Fink, the beginning of 1920 saw the League
establishing itself as the main intergovernmental institution in overseeing minority protection by
the efforts of Norwegian diplomat Erik Andreas Colban. With the Central Powers defeated, this
meant that the consequences of the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk were no longer applicable to
Europe’s political composition. It not only ended Russian participation in the war, but it also
granted German and Austro-Hungarian hegemony over the Baltic states, and recognized the
independence of Ukraine, Georgia, and Finland.41 But with the treaty overturned by the
Versailles Treaty, the Bolshevik government under Vladimir Lenin viewed the war’s conclusion
as an opportunity to support other communist movements across Eastern Europe by moving
some of its forces westward.42
At the same time, however, with the emergence of an independent Polish state, Poland’s
leaders viewed the conditions of both the enforced Versailles and annulled Brest treaties as
opportunities in restoring its nations’ pre-1772 borders, thus resulting in the movement of Polish
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troops eastward authorized by Chief of State Józef Pilsudski.43 Regional conflict gave rise to
ethnic group demands for national self-determination, which was something Paris peacemakers
in 1919 had to take into account when drawing the map of Europe along national lines. At the
same time, they wanted to ensure that there were states that were able to obtain adequate
resources to both support and shield themselves from the Bolshevik menace.
The Polish-Soviet war of 1920 would result in a massive migration crisis, as many of the
people fleeing from war-torn Russia created a triangular effect for sovereign claim, as many
German minorities in Poland appealed to the League for protection. This seemed to have caught
the League Council by surprise, for the conflict not only raised questions about sovereign rights
over unclaimed territories, but it introduced a new problem for the League – how it could help
minority populations impacted by this nation-state conflict. Since the League Council was
initially unprepared to take immediate action on German minority treatment in the midst of the
Soviet-Polish war, the League Secretariat was forced to oversee procedures over international
minority issues. This is when Colban would begin making his contributions, as he would serve as
the director of the League Secretariat’s new Administrative Commissions and the Minorities
Section from 1919 until 1927.44
During his tenure as director of this new Minorities Section, Colban made big steps in
ensuring that the League would commit itself to treating minority protection with great care and
detail. His first step in making the League a serious advocate for minority protection was to
ensure that all smaller states both within and outside the League would properly follow the
procedures in overseeing minority complaints.45 One aspect he kept in consideration was the
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possibility of states misrepresenting or neglecting these petitions. Poland was known for its
skepticism of the League’s minority procedure, as they attempted to block extensions for
petitioners, and exerted administrative pressure among petitioners, especially those of German
descendancy. Polish officials feared that the vast volume of German petitions would create
sympathetic feelings towards German sovereign rights among League officials, thus potentially
overturning the guidelines of the Versailles Treaty.46
With these issues over German and Polish sovereignty rights in the context of the
minority complaint system in mind, Colban proposed a resolution that would both prohibit any
state from rejecting petitions and would prepare for any public uproar that could arise in
response to such complaints. That was in a hypothetical sense, if the majority of the populace
within a nation-state viewed such complaints as inaccurate or exaggerated, then the League could
have the right to oversee demands for minority protection. Fortunately, in October of 1920,
Colban’s bipartisan innovations were adopted by the League. They would establish a procedure
to collect and distribute minority petitions, and a committee-of-three system that would examine
petitions and make decisions on whether minority protection rights were being violated.47 These
reforms were meant to ensure that the League would be actively responding to minority issues
that bounded certain Eastern and Central European states.
Despite what appeared to be an optimistic approach to dealing with minority protection
violations, the minorities system was based on some conflicting ideals and practices. For
example, while the council-of-three was required to investigate every petition through their own
intent, they had to rely on the accused state to provide information regarding minority
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complaints.48 This could have allowed the accused state to provide misleading information
regarding the legal status of minority communities. Such a setback made it initially challenging
for the League to create a centralized administrative system that was capable of handling
minority grievances.
These complications regarding the minority procedure also created tension among
League members, as the smaller states grew suspicious about the procedures of the minority
system since they were not involved within every stage of the process. Council members began
questioning their new investigative responsibilities. The organizing of minority proceedings
would also receive skepticism when Britain’s League of Nations Union (LNU) offered to
examine and advise the council on minority conditions in Eastern and Central Europe, hoping
that the League would conduct more public inquiries into minority violations.49 Such proposals
by the LNU were viewed by the secretariat as radical. For an imperialist state like Britain to take
charge of the day-to-day responsibilities of minority protection would have been going against
the principle of cooperation among all states, one of the main pillars of the League organization.
But most importantly, for Britain to solely take responsibility over minority inquiry alone would
potentially lead to biases while reviewing minority complaints.
After the LNU public proposals on Britain presiding over all minority protection issues
were turned down, LNU activist Gilbert Murray would contribute to Colban’s mission in making
the League the main institution to oversee minority protection in Europe by making crucial
institutional reorganizing proposals. Murray recommended the League establish a permanent
minorities commission, which would broaden the League’s responsibilities over minority
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protection.50 Even though Murray’s vision for such an administration did not become a reality, it
did inspire the adoption of a 1922 resolution that pledged all League members to not only extend
their obligations towards minority groups, but to also treat their own populations through the
same degree of communal acceptance as their own national citizens.51
Due to the significant inspirations from Colban and Murray, the League would
experience two intersecting developments – increasing membership within the organization and
an extension of minority obligations. Throughout the course of the early 1920s, the League
would see the admission of smaller states such as Albania, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania. As the League was accepting new members, it was also embracing more issues
relating to minority protection. From the May 1922 Geneva Convention between Germany and
Poland to the Treaty of Lausanne, to the conclusion of the Memel Convention in 1924, these
historical factors would place a total of 30 million people, 50 minority groups, and 15 states
under the protection of the League.52
These heavy responsibilities did not seem to intimidate Colban’s Minority Section, as
Colban’s next step was to use the League’s increased yearly budget of 1922 to create an
intelligence network. This extensively-structured network would place regional specialists in
charge of studying minority complaints, and then reporting back to senior officials so that they
could legislate and enforce minority protection policies. Additionally, Colban would make yearly
visits to Central and Eastern Europe, meet with government officials, and discreetly keep in
contact with minority representatives so that the League could have close relations with
individuals and governments that were concerned about minority protection.53
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At this point it appeared the League finally had a grasp on its commitment to deal with
the issue of refugees. However, even with Colban’s contributions, the League continued to
encounter problems in overseeing minority protection. These initial problems did not arise
among League members, but instead came from the responses of its critics. The League’s
opposition came from minorities and their representatives, especially those that were German.
Many German minorities felt that the system was too secretive and favored administrators of the
smaller states.54 In this sense, the League was not raising the issue of reviewing minority
grievances within their discussion sessions and were still inclined to let smaller states settle
issues pertaining to the protection of individuals. In addition, the League system still contained
some troubling aspects that continued to make it difficult for petitioners to have their appeals
examined. Between the years of 1921 and 1939, nearly 950 petitions from all minority groups
were sent to the League. Of those 950 petitions, only 550 were labeled as receivable, and out of
those that were received by League officials, 112 were sent from German minorities in Poland.55
These numbers suggests that the League did not have enough staff members to review all
minority petitions, thus leaving many minorities without any answers in ensuring that states were
providing protection for minority populations.
A final error within the League system pertained to petitions about the issue of eviction.
The length of time it took to process these petitions gave smaller states the opportunity to
“justify” its position for their demographic and economic complexities. For instance, in the case
of German minorities in Poland, the Polish government had seized properties belonging to
German minorities. When the Polish state was faced with possible charges of not providing
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German minorities means of protection, instead of restituting their properties, it provided
German minorities “monetary compensation” to migrate out of Poland.56 With German
minorities willingly leaving Poland, Polish officials used this migration of German settlers as
justification for Polish nationals moving in to take residence in areas that had once been
inhabited by ethnic Germans. By the time petitions about eviction reached the League, League
officials were not inclined to act, since Poland had already acted in addressing their own matters
regarding minority protection.57 Though the issue of minorities in Poland had been significantly
minimized, the way Poland addressed its minority issues was in a manner the League had not
envisioned. It had hoped for an improvement in the conditions of German minority living
conditions within the new Polish state, as opposed to their forced migration.
As the League continued to grasp its institutional weaknesses in overseeing minority
petitions, it would face another issue that further ruined the League’s progress in fulfilling its
obligations for minorities. The next challenge for the League would be dealing with the question
of Germany’s place within the League. Ever since the League was created in 1920, there had not
only been talks of considering German membership among its members, but there were initial
positive attitudes within the German nation about potentially joining this intergovernmental
body.58 However, German membership was quickly rejected by the League circle as many
nations felt that it was too soon to decide Germany’s place in the global community of nations.
This domestic movement for League membership would slowly decline. With events such as the
League Council’s decision in giving Upper Silesia to Poland and the French invasion of the Ruhr
Basin, many German citizens began to believe that the League was designed to deprive Germany
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of its sovereignty.59 This is very important to keep in mind, as the question of German
membership had always been within the minds of League officials ever since the organization’s
beginnings. However, the League was reluctant to allow the Fatherland a seat within the League,
which initially led Germans to have negative impressions about the League. This would have
severe implications for those that insisted Germany’s place in the League was plausible and
needed.
Despite the early negative developments towards possible German League admission,
German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann sought to keep Germany’s League movement
alive. Even though Germany had not been formally incorporated to the League, its officials had
been unable to raise concerns regarding minority mistreatment. Stresemann took charge of
Germany’s domestic politics in raising minority issues, as he was well known for his support of
the League of German Minorities in Europe (Verband der deutschen Minderheiten in Europa),
headed by Dr. Carl Georg Bruns.60 When representatives of German minorities from 12
countries met in Berlin to discuss how Germany’s surge of domestic conflict in the context of
minority discrimination and mistreatment in November 1924, it was suggested that the only way
to achieve tolerance among all of Germany’s ethnic communities was by securing cultural
autonomy for all. One of the ways in which this organization proposed to promote cultural
autonomy was when Bruns came up with a principle that would grant ethnic minorities the right
to create and administer their own schools.61
Impressed by his proposals, Stresemann not only would adopt Bruns’ ideas, but he also
sent a circular to all German delegates across Eastern Europe to ensure that all minority groups
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were being granted cultural autonomy. By doing this, Stresemann hoped that he would gain the
support of the new-born smaller states to grant all minority communities in Germany autonomy
as well. Even though he received favorable responses, Stresemann’s proposals were rejected by
the Bavarian and Prussian governments at the start of 1925.62 The rejections of Bavaria and
Prussia shows that minority rights were not well-received by some German politicians, thus
already suggesting to Stresemann that getting the League to accept his application for League
admission would be difficult if he could not get political actors within his state to support his
clause for minority protection.
This, however, did not intimidate Stresemann, as he continued his push for Germany’s
admission to become a permanent member of the League moving forward into the year 1925. He
believed that German admission would improve diplomatic relations not just between Germany
and the international community, but also between the Great War victors and the newly born,
smaller European sovereignties.63 Stresemann’s tenure as a German politician dealing with
foreign matters was unfortunately poorly timed, as he was facing a German population that had
grown skeptical of the value of League membership and the Locarno treaties. These agreements
were designed to both cement the post-World War I political order of the defeated Ottoman,
Austro-Hungarian, Russian, and German empires and to revise Germany’s relations with its
neighbors.64 In an effort to appeal to the German masses to have faith in their nation’s leaders,
Stresemann pledged that he would defend German interests abroad.65
While Stresemann’s public announcement was meant to calm the doubtful sentiments of
the German public, it unintentionally raised concern within the League, especially among some
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of the smaller states neighboring the Reich. Smaller states such as Poland and Czechoslovakia
began pushing for provisions that would restrict German admission after concluding that
Stresemann was attempting to dictate the direction of the League’s conduct.66 This resulted in the
League Council’s decision in June 1925 to once again reject Germany’s application for League
membership.67 The decision made showed that the League favored Poland and Czechoslovakia’s
claims of Germany potentially exerting too much participation and/or influence in the direction
of League policy.
It should be noted that such a decision was initially not easy to make among the League
governments, as there were varying opinions towards Germany potentially joining the League. In
fact, during the secret council meetings of June 9th and 10th, Britain’s Foreign Secretary Sir
Austen Chamberlain, along with Belgian and Swedish delegates, insisted that refusing to accept
Germany’s application for League acceptance would jeopardize the political revisions of the
Locarno agreement. At the same time, however, Chamberlain and French Foreign Minister
Aristide Briand were not enthusiastic about Germany pursuing its own campaign regarding
minority grievances and the treaties’ territorial provisions, for they considered Stresemann’s
message as a potential threat to League interests.68 In essence, the publicity surrounding
Stresemann’s appeal to the German public had only complicated Germany’s path toward being a
contributing member that would help promote and protect the rights of minorities as the League
was conflicted about whether or not Germany could be entrusted with such missions.
Not only was it difficult for Germany to gain membership into the League organization
due to a misunderstanding of Stresemann’s message, but there were numerous developments
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within the German state that further caused the League to approach Stresemann with suspicion.
Firstly, there continued to be a significant political divide between the East Prussian and the
Weimar Republican governments regarding Germany’s commitment to being an ideal model for
minority protection. The German Republic respected the rights of minorities in expressing their
cultural heritage. Stresemann stressed that the Republic should provide its minorities complete
control over their own social and cultural compositions. Furthermore, Stresemann was a strong
advocate for “cultural separatism,” thus taking the side of Danes, Poles, and Lusatians when it
came to the issue of minority political rights.69 Prussia, on the other hand, opposed Stresemann’s
ideals for they had more imperialistic understandings of the legal status of minorities. Prussia’s
Social Democratic Prime Minister Otto Braun positively viewed Prussia’s process of
Germanization, as he was firmly against Prussia’s Polish minorities who favored the autonomy
of a free, expansive Polish state.70
As Fink explains, this fundamental clash between the Weimar Republic and Prussia had
not been resolved when Germany applied for League membership. The different policy stances
regarding minority treatment only seemed to confuse League interpretation if Germany could
contribute to the League’s goal of protecting minority rights. For instance, in February of 1926,
Prussia legislated a law that restricted the capacity of Danish schools, which resulted in limiting
them to just three districts within the Scheswig area. In addition, after receiving a majority vote
in the Reichsrat, the Prussian government had the authority to block any national legislation that
pertained to improving the treatment of Danish minorities in Prussia.71 Such instances of
Prussian diplomacy made League officials speculate the possibility of Prussian politics
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weakening Germany’s ability to ensure minority right agreements were being properly followed
and enforced.
After taking Germany’s difficult political developments into consideration, the League
surprisingly authorized the admission of Germany into the League. But Germany’s admission in
September 1926 did not ensure that the League would accept the German Republic with open
arms as a participant in its mission to help minorities. Once accepted, Germany initially was
absent from discussion of minority rights and protection, as the League changed many of its rules
that prevented Germany to participate in the Committee of Three meetings.72 A possible
explanation as to why Stresemann did not present any initial challenges to the League’s decrees
in restricting Germany’s involvement on the conduct of minority protection was he may have
been concerned that too much interjection would possibly tarnish Germany’s relations with the
League. Simultaneously, however, Stresemann realized that the League, especially the British
and French governments, were discouraging Germany from taking their own steps towards
improving the League’s mission in helping minorities in Europe.73 Nevertheless, Stresemann
would slowly emerge from his bubble of silence and would return to his more active efforts in
addressing minority rights violations.
One of Stresemann’s greatest efforts in the late 1920s was his proposal of a study
committee that sought to provide recommendations on how the League could improve in its
current minority petition system. In February 1929, as part of his proposed study committee,
Stresemann advocated for a permanent minorities commission, to enlarge the role for petitioners
in the complaint process while decreasing the administrative pressure of states, and to get rid of
the three-party system overseeing minority petitions. Such brave proposals were unfortunately
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rejected by League officials, as Chamberlain was open to improving the complaint system, but
did not welcome Germany’s sovereign goals or minority groups advocating irredentism.74 But,
the League was open for an examination on Stresemann’s study committee to revise the
League’s current minority system. After being examined by a council committee consisting of
Britain, Spain, and Japan, Stresemann’s study committee plans would be disapproved. The
committee provided Berlin with a 100-page report explaining why they had declined many of
Stresemann’s ideas. In terms of modifying the minority system, it offered to inform petitioners
regarding the acceptance of their appeals, to require the committee-of-three to report back to the
League Council, and to make the League Secretariat provide annual studies on the works of the
League on minority protection.75
After the rejection of Stresemann’s proposals, a final decision on the issue of minorities
was set to be reached at the League Council meeting in June 1929 in Madrid. This would have
been a perfect opportunity for Stresemann to make a final plea for his case, but he unfortunately
was unable to make it to the Madrid session… on time at least. Instead, State Secretary Carl von
Schubert served as Stresemann’s substitute, and he went against the advice of Stresemann in
defending his study committee proposals and instead called to end the discussion on minority
petition revisions.76 Once Stresemann found out the League drafted the Madrid Resolutions
without his proposed clauses, Stresemann reluctantly accepted the terms of the agreement, which
resulted in the Council to never again raise the question of minority protection within the
League.
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From this section, it can be said that Stresemann’s efforts were well intentioned, and that
they were to become part of the League’s commitment to acknowledging and resolving the
hardships for minority groups in a hostile, post-war Europe. This section provides two
conclusions on the matter of minority protection in the League. The first is that Germany did its
best to promote ways in which the League could ensure the rights of minority groups. As
described through the diplomatic experiences of Stresemann, Germany’s abilities to contribute to
the League’s discussion on minority rights was often constrained by the League itself.
The second conclusion from the evidence above is that while the League attempted to
fulfill its obligations to minority protection, their long-term skepticism of Germany being able to
be a champion of minority rights had a drastic effect in the League’s progress in conducting
policies for minority relief. This next section will now delve deeper into the evolution of the
League’s philosophical struggle over minority rights and how statelessness only seemed to have
further complicated the League’s mission in protecting minorities.

The League’s Struggle with Statelessness
When the League was grappling minority protection, it also ran into a number of
individuals that were considered to be stateless, or those that did not have a legal relationship to a
legitimate sovereign. In an effort to counter-act statelessness and to promote the acquisition of
nationality, League officials made provisions that would allow individual states to grant refugees
national membership.77 As refugee relief work continued to be investigated by League officials,
the League would encounter practical issues when the issue of statelessness intersected with
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minority protection concerns. The first problem the League had to keep in mind was the issue of
national belonging, as League officials encountered a number of minority refugees that did not
have a national status. This inevitably brought up the other issue of the legality for a state to
determine an individual’s nationality. They also had to consider the extent in which international
law could regulate such issues of individual status. Such legal struggles made it difficult for the
League to establish a concrete, workable system that would ensure the protection of minorities,
regardless of their national status.
These concerns were first presented when the League was assisting survivors of the
Armenian Genocide as discussed within Watenpaugh’s article. Before and during the Great War,
the Ottoman empire was conducting domestic practices that League officials saw as clear
violations of the fundamental rights of children and women. Women and children captured by
Ottoman military personnel were sold to elite and middle-class homes within the empire’s major
cities.78 In a theoretical sense, the League viewed Ottoman society as outdated and isolated from
the modern understandings of the legal and moral status of individuals, which provided more
broad interpretations of national belonging. The League saw this as grounds for
intergovernmental intervention and to help those devastated by this inhumane chapter of human
history.
Some of the League’s first efforts in Turkey involved dealing with the issue of displaced
peoples and bringing them back to their identifiable communities. Starting its investigation at
Istanbul’s Neutral House, a rescue home designed to treat unidentified refugees, the Fifth
Committee of the League General Assembly knew that such a task would be difficult to
accomplish considering the region’s social instability and experiencing increasing waves of
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foreign migrants. Through the cooperative efforts of American nurse Emma Cushman and
Anglo-Irish doctor W. A. Kennedy, the two serving League commissioners looked through the
records of Ottoman state orphanages, where they discovered that Christian children had their
names changed to those of Islamic origin.79 Their studies estimated that almost 50 percent of all
orphans in Istanbul were of Armenian descent, with another 6,000 coming from other parts of
Anatolia. The studies conducted by Cushman and Kennedy were then sent to British observers
and representatives of the Greek and Armenian communities. British officials were assigned to
use the works of the League commissioners to help identify and return children to their
communities.80
As British aid workers were placing orphans, they realized that many either did not have
legal documentation or could not provide their true identities. These displaced individuals were
“encouraged” to recall any cultural customs to help British officials get an idea of with which
minority community they were affiliated.81 This was somewhat troubling, not only because of
any cultural biases that occurred during these placement operations, but it was an example of
what Western legal experts had difficulty dealing with. They were stuck with determining who
had the right, if not the means, to regulate nationality. As in the Stoeck case, British officials
determining the national status of displaced Armenian refugees was challenging earlier notions
about the state’s involvement in deciding the nationality of unidentified peoples. In the case of
the Armenian rescue, the British were ignoring the legal arguments made when the British High
Court had classified Stoeck as a man of no national status. This also went against the proposals
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of Stresemann in response to the League’s minority appeal system, who would have viewed this
case as the state applying too much bureaucratic pressure.
Did this mean that the League believed there were exceptions when considering the issue
of providing minority relief? The answer to this question is – it is probably safe to say that the
League was not aware of such ideological contradictions. Not having a concrete basis for
protecting individuals of no nationality raised questions among League officials regarding how
states should approach minority protection while keeping nationality regulations and
statelessness in mind.
During the spring of 1930, League members met to see how they all interpretated
nationality law, as well as whether global regulation was needed to oversee such issues of
membership. At the famous Hague Codification Conference, the majority of the delegates agreed
on the notion that states should not be allowed to expel people with no national status.82 Many
were aware that with the world dealing with its worst economic disaster, there were really few
places stateless people could migrate and find plentiful employment and settlement options.
However, the League also realized that the issue of statelessness addressed as a global
humanitarian crisis would conflict with the national laws of governments that authorized the
state’s full control over how they oversaw procedures for national membership.83 In sum, the
Hague Codification Conference internationalized the issue of statelessness, but it did so in two
contradictory ways. It raised the issue of statelessness as something all of the League’s
participants should consider. However, it did not create a consensus within the League regarding
how they should approach the question of statelessness while also taking into consideration their
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ideas about the state determining an individual’s national status. Instead, it revealed the League’s
contrasting ideologies in understanding statelessness and its connection to minority protection.
One of the ways in which the League could not come to a common understanding of how
it should interpret statelessness was related to how League governments understood the legal
status of refugees within a nation-state. Such interpretations had been developed and used during
the pre-WWI era of international imperialism. Even though there was a generally accepted
definition of the term “refugee,” which was an individual leaving or being forced to leave due to
political reasons, there was never a clear consensus on the rights and privileges of refugees.84
Because of such vague interpretations on refugees and their place within the framework of
international politics, there were no clearly defined rules regarding the treatment of refugees. 85
Furthermore, providing means of assistance to refugees not only was on a smaller scale as
opposed to the numbers of individuals the League faced during the interwar period, the right to
provide or refuse asylum was solely determined by the state. National governments never had to
resort to the guidance of an intergovernmental body that sought to address such challenges.
The onslaught of the Great War had resulted in great social and economic hardship for
national citizens of its participating powers, which in the past had been addressed by state
governments that provided means of assistance to their nationalized inhabitants.86 By the time
League members were exposed to the political movement of internationalism that emerged from
the 1920s, there were League legal experts who were still accustomed to the legal foundations of
the state defining who had access to state-provided resources such as hospitality, employment,
and settlement. Such procedures were tied to how the state defined its boundaries of national
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belonging. Many League experts still believed that nationality was an issue that should be
determined by individual states as opposed to through regulation and enforcement of an
international community.
As the League continued to find it difficult to place statelessness within its legal
framework of state sovereignty and minority protection, statelessness and its grasp on the
international order would not go away, as the League would be dealing with one of its greatest
challenges yet. With the consolidated rule of the National Socialists in 1933, questions regarding
the issue of statelessness would reemerge within the League’s works. Unfortunately, since the
League had such difficult times trying to place 1920 statelessness within their works of minority
protection, this would leave the League unprepared to deal with the thousands of Jews and other
minority peoples trying to escape the wrath of what would become the Third Reich.
In the meantime, by 1930, the League possibly could have benefitted from the services of
Nansen. Unfortunately, Nansen passed away that year and his Commission would then be
absorbed within the League of Nations Secretariat. The League then established the organization
that was meant to continue the services of the League’s former High Commissioner for
Refugees, known as the Nansen International Office for Refugees. This organization was meant
to continue coordinating global assistance to refugees that had been displaced from any major
regional or international crisis. The Nansen Office would be called to sort out the issue of Jewish
rights in Nazi Germany, but would their services be adequate in securing the legal protection for
Hitler’s victims?
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Chapter 2: Jewish Captivity in Hitler’s Germany
As League officials were grappling with the philosophical debates in resolving
statelessness, a new refugee problem was emerging. In July 1932, the National Socialists became
the largest party in the German parliament. Through the appointment of president Paul von
Hindenburg, the party’s leader Adolf Hitler would assume the position as Germany’s chancellor
in January 1933.87 Even though it was not until the death of Hindenburg when Hitler proclaimed
to be supreme leader of the entire German state, this did not stop the Nazis from initiating their
campaign of terror against those they deemed “enemies of the state”.
As Nazism expanded within Germany’s national government, 500,000 Jewish individuals
became racialized political targets.88 Antisemitic activism increased, as Nazi sympathizers were
lectured about the inferior status of Jews and blamed them for the social hardships of the early
1930s. Jews in Germany also began facing legal discrimination, as customers of Jewish
businesses were intimidated from going to such stores and individual Jews faced physical
assaults while law enforcement authorities did not retaliate on such accounts.89
The Nazi’s systemic process of excluding Jews from German society began on April 1,
1933, when Nazi leaders declared a national boycott against Jewish businesses.90 This would be
followed by the introduction of the Law for Reconstruction of the Professional Civil Service on
April 7, which banished all Jews and other political opponents of Nazism from all civil service
positions.91 This pair of anti-Semitic policies put the social status of Jews, communists,
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socialists, and other so-called “enemies of the state” at grave risk. The Nazis’ discriminatory acts
towards its enemies further escalated the demand for the League to ensure that it was obliged to
ensure the protection for minorities. One example of such demands was through the Bernheim
Petition, where Franz Bernheim fled Upper Silesia after he and other Jewish employees were
fired from a department store in an attempt to avoid the violent wrath of the April 1st boycotts.92
Such experiences created another migration vacuum, as many individuals from Germany were
either demanding protection from the Hitler Government or wanted to escape the political
discrimination and social violence that resulted from the rise of the nation’s new regime. This
turn of events in Germany went against the country’s obligations towards minority and refugee
protection that it had promised to fulfill when it was accepted as a League member in 1926. Due
to institutionalized anti-Semitism, ethnic minorities were beginning to be excluded from and
persecuted in Germany’s new Nazified culture.93
Traveling out of the country would have seemed a logical option for those experiencing
the social and economic mistreatment under the newly constructed Nazi regime. For those who
were able to escape Nazi Germany and secure an entry visa to the United States or elsewhere
either had private wealth or family connections.94 Unfortunately, for those without financial
advantages or familial ties outside of Germany were unable to secure entry visas for other
countries due to national legislation imposing restrictions on the quantity of visas that could be
issued and the reasons why they were being issued. To make matters worse, while the world was
grappling with its worst economic disaster, many of the traditional destinations of European
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immigration began implementing their own measures to restrict immigrant entry, thus making it
more difficult for Jewish and non-Jewish refugees to travel outside of Germany.95
This chapter will provide a comparative analysis of the refugee crisis that emerged that
emerged in Nazi Germany. It will not only help us understand why the High Commission on
German Refugees was established separately from the Nansen Office, but it will present the legal
differences between both cases. Such differences will explain how the issue of stateless peoples
in Eastern and Central Europe made it difficult for the League to approach the refugee question
in Germany. Such explanations will also help explain why James McDonald would resign as the
High Commissioner for Refugees Coming from Germany in 1935.

Jewish National Rights in the Post-World War I Era
Before going into the discussion on the pressing issue of Jewish protection in 1933 Germany, it
needs to be recognized that the question of Jewish rights did not first appear when the Nazis
assumed power. Jewish national rights had been discussed within the League in connection to
their policies regarding minority protection during the immediate post-World War I period. As
previously discussed, the Paris Peace Conference of 1920 was a fundamental point in the
League’s diplomatic history. It was not only the moment when it was expected for the League to
oversee the treatment of minorities, refugees, and stateless peoples simultaneously, but there was
another concern that needed to be addressed. Leaders of Jewish communities were concerned
that the League would not fulfill their obligations in protecting minorities, especially since
collective minority rights was both separate from and broader than Jewish national rights. In
addition, with the rise of anti-Semitic sentiment in post-war Central and Eastern Europe, Jewish
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representatives felt that it should have been the League’s responsibility to help pursue Jewish
diplomacy in order to ensure the safety of Jewish individuals like they were able to accomplish
with the status of displaced persons. These concerns over the League’s intentions to protect
minorities made Jews in Europe feel that the status of their community would also be in
jeopardy. This prompted western Jewish leaders to establish links with global humanitarian
organizations such as the League in order to gain collective representation.96
While tackling the issue of Jewish protection, there was dispute over the approach to
ensuring the protection of Jewish individuals. Pro-Jewish advocates such as Lucien Wolf saw the
matter as pertaining to the issue of individual religious identity, while the newly emerged Zionist
movement sought to create a political body that would represent a Jewish nation through League
membership.97 With the admission of smaller states that were known for their discriminatory
practices against Jews such as Finland, Latvia, and Estonia, which were given limits on their
obligations towards minority protection, many Jewish leaders initially felt that Jewish
representation would be difficult to achieve in the League. Even though Wolf and the League did
not view the status of Jewish individuals as linked to the reorganization of Europe’s post-war
sovereign order, it did not mean that the protection of Jewish communities within European
states was never acknowledged by League officials. Wolf believed that the status of Jews was
part of the question of minority protection.98 With that in mind, he tried to persuade the League
to change the ways they were overseeing the status of minorities shortly after the 1920 Paris
deal. For instance, he was able to convince the League Secretariat to establish urgent procedures
that would distribute petitions. He also continually encouraged the League’s Permanent Court of
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International Justice to be given judicial judgement over all minority cases, despite the League
Council’s objections.99
Despite the initial slow progress, Wolf managed to help the League make promising steps
toward ensuring the protection of Jewish minorities. As head of the Jewish Colonization
Association (ICA), he helped organize conferences in 1921 and 1922 between leading Jewish
emigration committees to provide refugees humanitarian aid. These ICA conferences enabled
Wolf to work closely with Nansen, who would assume fiscal responsibility for Jewish refugees.
Together, they managed to provide transit permission for Russian refugees from nations
neighboring the Soviet Union and were able to provide travel and resettlement possibilities in
South America, Canada, and Australia.100
At the same time, however, there were serious loopholes that allowed many of the
League’s newest members to not enforce their obligations towards minority protection. From
Vienna’s government denying citizenship to Galician Jews solely for racial reasons, to the
violent suppression of Jews, Hungarian, and German minorities in Czechoslovakia, the League
viewed such cases of minority persecution as domestic issues that were not discussed within the
minority treaties or the League’s Covenant. In particular, the League’s new small members were
given provisions that allowed them to opt the fate of individuals that differed in race or language
from the majority of the territory’s population.101
Such provisions and understandings regarding sovereignty were drawn from the League’s
mandate system, which was established to deal with the status of individuals within mandated
states. The concerns of mandated peoples in effect led to the development of the League’s
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commitment in addressing the concerns of the individuals that represented the majority of a
sovereign state and not taking the minority sector into consideration.102 The League refusing to
challenge their members handling on minorities out of respecting the lenient terms of the
minority agreements that were agreed between the Great Powers and smaller European states,
prevented it from adjusting its approaches towards minorities, thus leaving the fate of Jewish
treatment up to the individual League states. These legal flaws not only left Jewish communities
vulnerable to discriminative, violent acts from League members during the 1920s, but they help
us understand the bureaucratic challenges the League would face when the refugee crisis
emerged in Nazi-controlled Germany.

The Nansen Office and Germany’s Refugees
When the migration problem erupted after the German Nazi seizure of power, the League
believed that its Nansen Office would be able to resolve the issue. League officials were inspired
by the works of Dr. Fridtjof Nansen, who served as the League High Commissioner for Refugees
from 1921 to 1930. He was known for providing food, medical supplies, and proper
documentation to the 800,000 refugees stranded in Constantinople that were wanting to escape
the social chaos of the Russian Revolution. Such efforts were repeated for the thousands of
Armenians that were settled in refugee camps in the Middle East. After Nansen passed away, the
League created a bureau of the League Secretariat known as the Nansen International Office for
Refugees.103 This department would continue the refugee works of Nansen, and League officials
believed that its services were appropriate in Nazi Germany.
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Initially, in 1933, officials of the Nansen Office appeared to be optimistic that it could
provide its services to German refugee question. The organization had taken several steps that
started to position itself as the legitimate diplomatic body to orchestrate a means of assistance. It
had already established quasi-diplomatic posts in several countries to deal with reluctant
governments and to see practical and legal needs of the refugees. It also organized a global
network that consisted of offices and staff members that were well experienced in providing
resettlement and welfare services.104 Furthermore, the Nansen Office began developing plans to
help the German refugees before it would assume its new role as the overseer for refugees from
Germany through the 1933 Dutch resolution.105
However, Geneva bureaucrats believed that if the Nansen Office were to lead efforts in
providing relief to German refugees, it would need the right personality to coordinate assistance
policies to refugees from Germany. T. F. Johnson was appointed Secretary General of the
Nansen Office by the League Council, and would serve in the organization until its scheduled
closing date of December 31st, 1938. Unfortunately, Johnson could not establish the same level
of confidence within the League like his predecessor Nansen. In fact, the League’s Secretary
General, Sir Eric Drummond, referred to Johnson as someone with an “unfortunate personality”
who was unfit to meet the job expectations of a High Commissioner. In response to Drummond’s
comments about his status as a bureaucrat overseeing the protection of refugees from Germany,
Johnson did not think highly of the League either, calling the organization a complete
disappointment to the world.106 The verbal evidence above suggests that relations were
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weakening between the Nansen branch and League organization when Johnson was serving as
Nansen’s substitute in overseeing refugee concerns.
In addition to the poor relations among the two humanitarian groups during Johnson’s
tenure with the Nansen Office, the idea that the Nansen Office could assume responsibility for
refugees from Germany overlooked one critical matter: The legal situation the refugees from
Germany faced was strikingly different from the problems faced by the refugee groups during
the Russian Revolution. The Intergovernmental Arrangements for the Nansen Refugees were
tasked with addressing the legal problems of stateless peoples arising from their lack of identity
documents. In this case, when most of the Russian and Armenian refugees had been declared
stateless by the denationalization decrees of the Soviet and Turkish governments in 1921 and
1924, they were forced to relinquish their national passports and thus no longer possessed the
right to diplomatic protection on an international basis.107 Due to the lack of proper travel
documentation and the extensive control of state borders, the Nansen Office created the
“‘Nansen Passport.” This international certificate provided resettlement options for stateless
refugees, as well as official documents that granted national origin in the country of
immigration.108 It also enabled stateless peoples to enter the workforce, qualify for numerous
means of assistance (social, economic, and medical), and granted Nansen passport carriers to
return to the state that had originally issued the document.109
In contrast, there was a loophole that made the situation for German refugees more
difficult for the League to interject. The German refugees, whether or not they were deprived of
their nationality, were still national citizens, since the Nazi regime did not terminate their
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passports. They were deprived of the ability to exit the country. Nansen passports were eligible
for those that no longer had a national status. While McDonald wanted to oversee the issue of
travel documentation and identity for refugees without proper passports, the Governing Body of
the High Commission advised McDonald that it would be “inadvisable to institute a special
traveling paper for German refugees.”110 It suggested the governments of the nations where
refugees were residing should authorize all proper clearance for refugees to travel outside of the
country.111 The Administrative Body recommended that refugees residing in immigration
countries should be able to acquire documents of travel and identity that would be valid for at
least one year and endorsed with a return clause. In theory, League diplomats believed this
would enable refugees from Germany to gain documentation faster as opposed to waiting for an
agreement or convention among all League members to adopt identification and travel
documents for refugees.

James G. McDonald and Emergence of the High Commission for Refugees Coming From
Germany
Considering these legal limits, it was then suggested by members of the League Council in
October of 1933, that the League should nominate a High Commission that would oversee the
legal challenges of the entrapped refugees in the Nazi state. This High Commissioner would be
tasked with negotiating and directing collaboration among all countries that had the capabilities
of providing immediate relief to the refugees in the midst of the international economic
disaster.112 League officials believed that the best person qualified for the position of
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Commissioner should be someone that had the experience, competence, and outlook that could
raise the intensity of this issue and encourage a cooperative mobilization among a number of
private organizations that would provide funding for refugee relief.113
But who could fill in the shoes of an individual like Dr. Nansen to press the issue for
League officials? The League was looking for someone who resembled the same personality of
Nansen since he was successful in providing assistance to displaced peoples from the chaotic
developments in Eastern Europe. Former American President Herbert Hoover was considered as
a potential candidate, as he was known for coordinating efforts to provide food supplies to
Belgium during the First World War and helping Nansen save the thousands of refugees fleeing
from war-torn Russia. Even though Hoover possessed the organizational skills and the
experience in providing refugees humanitarian aid, he ruined his chances of taking the position
to oversee refugee issues from Germany. From his leniency towards German war reparations, to
imposing protective tariffs on European exports, League officials did not view him as a qualified
candidate to fix the refugee question in Germany. Considering the lack of support Hoover
received on an international scale, he suggested to himself that he would be unable to rally
support from the Franklin Roosevelt administration and did not consider the position.114
Meanwhile, British and American Jewish private organizations were taking their own
steps in finding who they believed would best suit up to the task as High Commissioner for
Refugees Coming from Germany. British Jews endorsed an Englishman named Viscount Robert
Cecil. Cecil was an experienced and well-known individual in the League, for he played a vital
role in writing the Covenant of the League during the Paris Peace meeting. He also was working
for the League as a representative of the British Foreign Ministry and head of the League of
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Nations Association in Britain. In comparison, American Jews also nominated a League veteran
by the name of General Jan Smuts. Smuts also possessed political expertise, as he served as the
prime minister of South Africa and was a key mediator at the 1919 Paris Conference for what
would eventually become the British Commonwealth.115
While the League did consider Cecil and Smuts as potential candidates due to their
diplomatic specialization, they were also concerned with the nationality of the High
Commission. Specifically, the League was looking for someone of American descent that would
ideally help America grow out of its shell of isolationism and get the United States to join the
League. If not that, the League at least sought to get America more involved in European-based
international matters. This is when the famous James McDonald begins to emerge in the global
context of refugee rescue. He was endorsed by Felix Warburg and James Rosenburg of the
American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee. Both men argued strongly that because of
McDonald’s experience with the Rockefeller Foundation he was able to gain an expertise in
international affairs by meeting with officials of Jewish organizations in America, Britain, and
Europe.116 His association and popularity with private Jewish organizations made McDonald
appear as a man who could best sympathize with the poor refugee treatment of the Nazi regime
and its implications.
In addition, McDonald was well respected by European governments for his advocacy on
German affairs. He helped establish healthier relations between America, Europe, and the
League organization during his term as chair of the American Foreign Policy Association.
McDonald also was able to establish healthy diplomatic contact with members of the Nazi
regime such as Ernst Hanfstaengl and Hjalmar Schacht, thus showing that he was able to discuss

115
116

Burgess, Refugees from Nazi Germany, 51.
Burgess, Refugees from Nazi Germany, 51-52.

56
matters with Germany’s new hostile government through professional composure.117 His work
impressed many within the League, especially League Secretary General League Joseph Avenol,
who personally endorsed McDonald as a candidate for High Commissioner.118 Due to the
amount of confidence that both American private Jewish organizations and influential AngloAmerican political actors, President Roosevelt went ahead and formally nominated McDonald as
the High Commission for Refugees Coming from Germany despite his initial reluctance. The
League Council quickly advanced his appointment although British Jewish organizations still
favored Robert Cecil and did not trust McDonald for being too close to the German
government.119 Nevertheless, his appointment as the commissioner of this newly founded
special commission in promoting and improving the well-being of refugees victimized by the
rise of Nazism was confirmed on October 26th, 1933.

Inadequacies of McDonald’s High Commission Towards Rescuing Victims of Nazism
With the establishment of a new institution that would oversee the escalation of the German
refugee crisis secured, the League was hopeful that under McDonald’s supervision it could
successfully navigate and resolve the refugee issue. Unfortunately for Mr. McDonald, his time
with the High Commission would be short-lived due to some escalating setbacks that prompted
him to resign. The first pertained to the source of funding. Right from the beginning the League
had failed to construct a reliable backbone that could provide a substantial number of resources
for refugees. While McDonald’s High Commission was promoted by the League, it lacked a key
ingredient that made the Nansen Office a more successful refugee relief program – centralization
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in financing. In other words, all the funding the Nansen Office was receiving for both its
operational budget and resources they were distributing to refugees were coming from the banks
of national governments, both League and non-League members. However, when the League
Assembly resolution in October of 1933 was passed to appoint a commission separate from the
Nansen Office, it also outlined the League’s expectations on how private institutions would
contribute to the cause in providing refugee assistance.120
Even though nations were invited to assist refugees, there were some proponents of the
resolution that highlighted the major roles for private institutions in the functioning and
organization of the High Commission. Firstly, it was suggested that the expenses for the
collaborative works between the High Commissioner’s office and a governing body consisting of
states and possibly private organizations willing to provide refugee relief should be financed by
funds contributed voluntarily through private or other sources.121 Secondly, the final request
within the memorandum noteed, “[T]he Assembly expresses the firm hope that private
organizations will collaborate in every way with the High Commissioner for the success of this
relief action.”122 These initial expectations of having private institutions take the responsibility in
providing funds for refugee aid indicates both the structural problems that the High Commission
would soon experience, especially towards its downfall.
Another issue that the High Commission encountered was the League’s failed aspirations
of getting the American government more involved in Nazi Germany’s refugee crisis. This
setback is related to the prior problem of funding. Due to the lack of a centralized, reliable form
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of finances, the High Commission was experiencing a shortage of funds needed to fulfill their
obligations to provide humanitarian assistance. After McDonald’s fundraising campaign failed,
sometime before the end of 1934, it was highly recommended by the Governing Body of the
High Commission for the Commissioner call for an urgent meeting of any organizations
interested in the refugee problem and able to provide financial contributions.123 At this point,
McDonald knew that through a continuation of resorting to private organizations for funding the
operations of the High Commission it would further lead towards a slippery slope of bankruptcy.
He then believed that it would be best to confront the fiscal problems of the Commission with
American government officials.
On January 2, 1935, McDonald wrote a report to the American Assistant Secretary of
State Wilbur J. Carr. In his letter, he requested the American government provide the High
Commission a contribution towards its administrative expenses. Even though Jewish and nonJewish organizations had managed to raise nearly 6 million US dollars, McDonald stressed how
the financial needs for refugees, especially for emigration purposes, were still very costly.124 He
then went on to say that the resources of the organizations that had been donated were
completely drained over the course of the institution’s two years.125 While it at first appeared that
McDonald was only dependent on the Americans, he informed the Secretary of State Department
of Sweden’s “definite unconditional commitment” to donate towards the 1935 budget of the
Commission. In addition, McDonald stated that Czechoslovakia, Denmark, and other smaller
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countries had indicated their willingness to donate and suggested that it was likely that the Great
Powers on the Governing Body (France, Italy, and Great Britain) would follow suit if the US
provided a contribution of their own.126
The possibility of a coalition between the United States, the Great Powers of the League,
and the smaller nations of Europe appeared to be the High Commission’s best chance in
accomplishing its mission to rescue the refugees trapped in Hitler’s totalitarian state. However, it
appeared that some within the US government did not share the same sentiments as McDonald,
for there were mixed interpretations on America’s potential involvement in providing donations
to the High Commission Office. At first, when William Phillips, the Under Secretary of State,
responded to McDonald’s inquiry about requesting for American contributions, he claimed that
President Franklin was under the impression that the High Commission had already received
financial contributions from all governments that were interested in the refugee issue without a
pledge of fiscal support from the US.127
Then within his second response to the American Representative on the Committee for
Refugees from Germany J. P. Chamberlain on February the 25th, William Philips, the Under
Secretary of State, claimed that the President would ask Congress to approve a financial donation
to be made out to McDonald’s Commission Office only if the Great Powers of the League would
oblige themselves to make similar contributions.128 One week later, Mr. Chamberlain reported
back to Philips saying that McDonald suggested that the US executive branch should not move
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forward with its notion to ask for American involvement in raising funds for the High
Commission’s operations due to a number of other countries becoming more reluctant in
providing funding for the Commission’s budget.129 Had there been a more mutual understanding
among American officials on the High Commission’s desperate need for funds, McDonald’s
theory of bringing the United States closer to the High Commission might have led more
countries, particularly the bigger nations of the League, to either pledge or provide more
contributions that the Commission was seeking for its day-to-day operations.
As the diplomatic coalition between the United States and Europe to raise funds for
McDonald’s Commission collapsed, McDonald made one final effort to get as many refugees as
possible out of Nazi Germany. McDonald and his colleague Samuel Guy Inman, a specialist in
Latin American policies and the secretary of the American Committee on Cooperation in Latin
America, went on a tour to South America. They were investigating the economic and social
conditions of Latin American countries so that they could devise plans for refugee resettlement
and livelihoods. Part of their mission was to initiate negotiations with the countries that appeared
to be sufficient for settlement and economic purposes. McDonald’s studies indicated that Brazil
and Argentina possessed an enormous amount of land that could have been used for living
development and opening many economic opportunities for refugees.130
Unfortunately, the main obstacle that prevented the large-scale settlement of refugees
from taking place in these bigger South American nations was due to their political atmospheres.
In Brazil, a fascist movement inspired by German National Socialism had fundamentally
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changed the course of its domestic politics, as new immigration restrictions were written into its
new constitution on July 16, 1934. In this newly adopted constitution, a fixed quota of 3,090
immigrants of German ethnicity a year was established, and only 10% of that quota could either
be Jews or refugees. With such strict migration policies in mind, the Brazilian government
insisted that the only way they would be able to take in mass numbers of refugees was if they
were identified as stateless. Since the majority were identified as Jewish German citizens, their
migration channels within the country were much more regulated as opposed to those of stateless
status.131
Similarly, Argentina’s massive wave of ultra-nationalist sentiment in its political realm
led to a number of exclusionist policies, which especially pertained to a resistant coalition
against foreign meddling in its political affairs and the invitation of foreigners.132 Inman’s
analysis also proved to be disappointing. While he affirmed that there were fewer bureaucratic
obstacles for refugees to gain entry into smaller Latin American states, opportunities for labor
were more limited as opposed to Brazil and Argentina.133 In essence, the High Commission was
forced to acknowledge that the issue of refugee resettlement could only be resolved through the
willingness of nations in granting the right to seek refuge in their territories.
To make matters worse, when the 1935 Saar Plebiscite occurred, it presented a new legal
challenge that League officials had never considered in the past – regional nationality. When
Germany lost the First World War, one of the repercussions was losing approximately 13% of its
territory. One of the regions that the Germans were forced to relinquish was the Saar region.
Shortly after Hitler’s rise to power, the Saar would also experience an accelerating rise of anti-
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Semitism through the establishment of its own National Socialist party under the direction of
Alois Spaniol.134 Along with these similar political developments of radicalization, there were
growing sentiments for the Saar region to reunite itself with Germany. At the same time,
however, groups such as the communists, socialists, and Jews expressed negative opinions
regarding reunification. Coincidentally, this spurred Spaniol’s party, as well as the other rightwing and moderate rightist parties, to form the so-called Deutsche Front, and conduct a violent
campaign to ease any opposition. When it came for the Saar to decide its fate to either remain
independent or reunify with Germany, election results showed that approximately 90% of the
Saar people favored reunification.135 The Saar reuniting itself with the Reich only intensified the
refugee crisis, as out of the 3300 inhabitants within the territory, about 1500 of them came from
Germany to take refuge in the Saar after 1933.136
On May 24, 1935, the Council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution that would
give refugees from the Saar identity certificates.137 Countries such as France, Bulgaria, Denmark,
and Estonia were optimistic that assistance to the emigrants from the Saar should be considered
to be part of the League’s responsibilities.138 While the majority of both League and non-League
members that responded to the extension of the Nansen passport were enthusiastic, there were
concerns raised by some national governments. Governments like the Austrian government
rejected the adoption of a special category of identity certificates since there was a small number
of Saar refugees in their nation. Austrian officials viewed that the expense and labor involved in
issuing a new type of identity document would not be justified. The United Kingdom did not
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have any objections to the adoption of such a plan, unless the issuing of the certificate would
only be viable for one year.139 From the initial stages of adopting Nansen documentation for Saar
refugees, there was an expectation that such an extension was not intended for long-term
resettlement and employment opportunities. This suggests that the League had either
miscalculated or had not given adequate consideration of the consequences of constant, shortterm migration patterns.
As a result, the Council of the League had entrusted the Nansen International Office with
the protection of Saar refugees, where the institution made an effort to move forward with
extending the Nansen passport system to this new group of refugees. However, the Nansen
passport was only extended to those who were native to the Saar and did not have possession of
passports that proved their national origin.140 Those that had come from Germany could not have
access to such documents, which required the High Commission for Refugees from Germany to
create a new basis for emigration and aid for non-nationals.
Taking matters from bad to worse for the League, McDonald composed a long letter that
not only announced his resignation as head of the Commission on Refugees from Germany, but
his grievances on why the Commission failed in providing assistance to the German Jewish
refugees. McDonald raised the issue that during the last meeting of the Permanent Committee of
the Governing Body of the High Commission on October 16th, 1935, many, including
McDonald, felt that the work of assistance in countries of refuge could have been conducted
more efficiently had the organization been under the direct authority of the League.141 He
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claimed that creating the High Commission separate from the League organization in order to
avoid a veto on creating a commission that would deal with the refugee problem in Germany,
who was a League member before its withdrawal in October 1933, weakened its capabilities
from the beginning.142
Another aspect that McDonald raised was the Reich’s newest set of policies that further
escalated the refugee crisis. Attached to his resignation memorandum, McDonald provides a
comprehensive analysis of the guidelines of German legislation, as well as the effects of those
policies, particularly the Nuremburg Laws. The Nuremburg Laws were a series of laws that
dictated the civic rights of Jews and other individuals that were not considered to be Germanblooded.143 While the Nazi government’s laws dated to September 15, 1935, McDonald observed
that Nazi ideological concepts of citizenship and race were traced as far back to when the party
was first established in February of 1920. These post war-era proposals called for the
denationalization of Jewish and other “non-German” individuals and were to be subjected to
laws concerning foreigners and guests.144 This suggests that McDonald was surprised and
disappointed that the League appeared to be unaware that a Nazi transition of power in Germany
would eventually result in political acts that sought to deprive Jews and non-Germans of their
rights and privileges.
The raising of these legal issues contradicted his criticism that the League failed to
address the refugee problem through a humanitarian lens, for he does raise the moral
implications of anti-Semitic policy. McDonald mentioned how the targeted subjects of Nazi
exclusion policies were forced to relinquish their livelihoods from the cultural, political, and
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intellectual sectors of German society. Newspaper publications, which were directly sponsored
by the Nazi state, encouraged those of “Aryan” status, especially children to hate, spy, attack and
segregate themselves from “non-Aryan” folk.145 Such acknowledgements of the devastating
social effects of Nazi-sponsored exclusion illustrates McDonald’s initial concerns about how
Nazism had accelerated the challenges to the refugee question for aid. They also show that
McDonald was suggesting if League intervention was not established, poor refugee treatment
would only worsen and create more difficulties for the League going forward. Whether
McDonald’s resignation of the League was solely connected to the passage of the Nuremburg
Laws is a whole different dilemma, but the circumstantial evidence could support such a theory.
What is clear, however, is that what McDonald claimed was keeping such legal issues in mind
would improve the way the League devised and organized solutions towards refugee protection.
Despite the initial optimism in the creation of the High Commission for Refugees
Coming from Germany with McDonald serving as its leader and replacing the Nansen Office to
oversee the refugee crisis in Germany, it was then declared that December 1935 would mark the
final month of McDonald’s tenure as Commission. The resignation of McDonald made it appear
that the League would have to consider a liquidation of the institution and become the sole
beneficiary to address and resolve the issue of Germany’s entrapped refugees. While the League
struggled in tackling the escalating difficulties of refugees within Nazi territory, a new institution
called the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees was established to consider the problem of
refugees in Central Europe. But was this organization created to take over or contribute to the
League’s mission of saving thousands from Hitler’s tyranny?
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Chapter 3: The Continuation of the Jewish Refugee Crisis and Expansion of Nazism
Historians such as Burgess have assumed that McDonald’s resignation in 1935 signaled that the
League would no longer play a role in refugee affairs. It is not necessarily true to say that once
McDonald left the Commission, the League was no longer involved in German refugee affairs. It
is also an exaggeration to suggest that when the Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees was
formed in August 1938, this American-led establishment took over the policy making for the
Jewish refugee crisis. Instead, what this chapter will reveal is even before the arrival of the U.S.led Intergovernmental Committee, the League attempted to take it upon itself to extend
McDonald’s hopes that a solution to the German refugee crisis could be reached.
If we recall from the previous chapter, McDonald had provided a number of complaints
in his resignation letter as to what led to the High Commission’s failure in fixing the German
refugee issue. One of McDonald’s biggest complaints was the League making the High
Commission a separate agency of the League. Since the Commission Office was not formally
part of the League, private contributions were used to cover both the operational and
administrative costs of the office.146 While McDonald did raise the legal issues of the Jewish
refugee crisis, he also raised the moral implications of anti-Semitic policy. For instance, when
referencing the Nuremburg Laws, he discussed how the Nazis exclusion policies not only heavily
impacted the lives of Jews through an economic perspective, but they escalated into being a very
personal issue for Jewish people. They were forced to relinquish their citizenship and
employment opportunities and were being intimidated by both Nazi state rhetoric and National
Socialist activism.147

146
147

LNA, “Letter of Resignation,” 6.
LNA, “Letter of Resignation,” 8-10.

67
After the appointment of McDonald’s successor Sir Neil Malcolm in February 1936, the
League did make some institutional changes. Firstly, the High Commission under Malcolm did
become part of the League, which enabled the Office to receive direct financial contributions
from any state affiliated with the League to cover administrative costs. It also would receive
guidance through the League Secretariat on how to approach the refugee issue as opposed to
having its own governing body.148 While the League started to respond to McDonald’s final
inquires, the pressing issue for the League was would it consider the moral questions involved in
the refugee issue and convert from approaching the protection of Jewish refugees from a political
standpoint to a humanitarian lens. When approaching the status of German refugees, the League
had hoped that a diplomatic solution could be negotiated with the German Nazi government.
However, after McDonald was unable to persuade Nazi officials from reconsidering its immoral
treatment of their political targets, the League realized that they needed transition from
diplomacy to intergovernmental action if they wanted to reach a definite solution.
This chapter will now delve into the League’s political history after 1935, starting with
the extended discussion on the status of refugees from the Saar up to the midst of the second
major war in Europe. What these next sections will entail are the ways in which the League tried
to respond to the escalation of the German refugee crisis due to the territorial expansion of
Nazism. The first part of the chapter will entail not only the institutional changes the League
began making after McDonald resigned as High Commissioner, but it will reveal the geopolitical developments and continued organizational struggles that complicated the League’s
progress in coming up with a definite solution to the intensified refugee problem. It also will
provide detail on the ways in which the League would operate when the Intergovernmental
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Committee was created as a refugee relief organization. This section intends to test Burgess’
claim that McDonald’s resignation in 1935 signaled the end of the League’s involvement
providing direct refugee assistance and his assumption that the Intergovernmental Committee
replaced the League as the sole refugee agency tasked with providing refugee relief in 1938.

The Triangular Effect: The League, the High Commission, and the Nansen International
Office for Refugees
McDonald’s plea for reform appeared to have a fundamental impact in the way the League
would restructure itself in response to the acceleration of the refugee problem. To begin the new
year and a new administrative chapter for the League, their first task was to create a statute
regarding the status of Saar refugees after the League Council proposed to individual
governments in extending the Nansen passport system to the Saar refugees.149 Through a report
by the Rapporteur of the Ecuador Representative Gonzalo Zaldumbide, a proposal was passed on
January 20, 1936 to take provisional measures in regards to the protection and treatment of the
Saar refugees. They decided to refrain from creating a permanent institution to oversee the
German refugee problem and instead passed the League Committee’s recommendation in
creating a provisional character. This temporary character would involve the appointment of a
President of the Governing Body of the Nansen Office and a new High Commissioner for
Refugees coming from Germany.150 Mr. Zaldumbide also added in his proposal that the League
Council should appoint a League Committee consisting of seven League members to provide
practical proposals to both offices of refugee protection. In essence, what the League was passing
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was a resolution that would combine the functions of the Nansen Office and the High
Commission for German refugees towards the same issue, thus bringing both institutions under
the direct authority of the League. Three days later, Norwegian member of the Permanent Court
of Arbitration, Michael Hansson, was appointed as the President of the Governing Body of the
Nansen International Office for Refugees.151 The next day, Malcolm, former President of the
Council of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, was appointed the new High
Commissioner of the League Nations to deal with refugees coming from Germany.152
Not only would there be a new League Commission on Refugees, but the League began
making efforts to financially support the new Commission’s operations. McDonald had reminded
how difficult it was for private Jewish organizations in being responsible for the financial
expenses of refugee assistance.153 However, while the League Committee had considered that the
various tasks associated with refugee protection to be within the province of private
organizations, they granted Malcolm the ability to establish a system of liaisons that he believed
would be more effective.154 These organizational reforms appeared to be responding to
McDonald’s wishes. Would these reforms in 1936 be enough to find homes for people who were
fleeing from their homelands that were being taken over by the Third Reich? In simplest terms,
the answer to that question is unfortunately not. It needs to be remembered, however, that the
reason for such a negative response to this inquiry is not simply because the League lacked any
bureaucratic efforts in responding to the escalation of the refugee crisis. Rather, the series of
complicated explanations that will follow shows that there were yet again more international
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developments that seemed to further complicate the League’s efforts in resolving the tragic
dilemma of refugee mistreatment.
Even though the League was able to establish a statute for the Saar refugees, they were
already experiencing problems with settling refugee classes they were already supervising. When
responding to the circular letter dated July 19, 1935, on the issue of settling Russian, Armenian,
Assyrian, and other refugee classes, several national governments indicated reluctance at
providing means of assistance to refugees that the League had pledged to help through the
services of its Nansen Office. Delegates from the Belgian, Dutch, and Italian governments
responded that it could not afford any material aid for refugees due to their densely populated
homelands that needed economic support. Responding on behalf of the Secretary of the Foreign
Office Sir Samuel Hoare, Adrian Holman protested in a similar manner, but offered to allow
refuge to those that held “definite prospects of employment”. Enrique J. Gajardo, Head of the
Permanent Chilean Bureau, claimed with the exception of the Magallanes, the Chilean
government had no more vacant lands available since they had been occupied by naturalized
foreigners and were only allowing the entry of foreigners for exceptions that he did not go into
detail.155 If the League was having trouble with continuing to settle the refugee classes that were
placed under the authority of the Nansen Office, the next problem for the League was how it
could afford to pay for the settlement expenses for the Saar refugees.
When the Council of the League of Nations outlined the High Commissioner’s duties,
members of the Council agreed that the High Commissioner would need to prepare and arrange
for an Inter-Governmental Conference which would discuss for a system of legal protection for
refugees coming from Germany.156 Though the passage of a passport for German refugees was
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relatively easy, League officials would have to be aware that the issuing of a travel certificate
would guarantee refugees the ability to resettle and allow them to seek employment
opportunities. This led to the League Council’s proposal to ask state members of the League that
had authorized the Nansen passport system to extend its provisions to the refugees that were
wanting to leave the Saar region on July 30, 1935.157 When states were responding to the
Council’s inquiry, they received mainly positive responses. The League did receive, however, a
critical memorandum from the government of India on its reaction to extending the Nansen
Passport system to Saar refugees. Responding on behalf of its Secretary of State in February of
1936, Indian Office official E. J. Turner stated that the Government of India would allow such
provisions to be applied towards those wanting to leave the Saar as long as it could retain its
right in limiting any holder of the Nansen Certificate from re-entering its state after the
expiration of the certificate’s appliance date.158 The response from the Indian government
illustrates that the League Council was also facing challenges where individual governments
were open to applying the Nansen passport to the Saar refugees, but only if the League would not
intervene in the ways care-giving states were overseeing their own immigration policies. This
suggests that care-giving states seen the issuance of Nansen documents as for short-term
practicality as opposed to long-term.
Nevertheless, Malcolm, along with League and non-League contracting states, met in
Geneva on July 4, 1936, to discuss the provisions for travel documentation of German refugees.
Even though the League was able to agree on a statute for German refugees, there were some
troubling aspects within the guidelines the League agreed to when concerning the treatment of
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German refugees. Article I of the Provisional Arrangement concerning the status of Refugees
coming from Germany, defined the term “refugee coming from Germany” as “any person who
was settled in that country who does not possess any nationality other than German nationality
and in respect of whom it is established that in law or in fact he or she does not enjoy the
protection of the Government of the Reich.”159 The definition of refugees from Germany did not
include those that would be placed within annexed territories. This made it difficult for the
League, by international regulation, to respond when faced with the issue of refugees that were
trapped within Austria, which annexed itself with the Nazi Reich when the League would
enforce this provision one month before Anschluss happened in 1938.
Also, in Article 2 of this temporary arrangement, the section outlining the guidelines of
issue and renewal made it affordable and less difficult for those eligible to obtain this new travel
certification. However, the passport would only be valid for one year from the date it would be
issued. Furthermore, consuls that had authorization from the issuing nation could extend the
certificates’ validity for a period up to six months.160 Such time restraints suggest that the High
Commission was not intending to create travel legislation that would make it more practical for
German refugees to establish long-term resettlement and labor opportunities.
In addition to the strict time constraints placed on refugees, these provisional measures
also granted several flexible guidelines in which contracting states were allowed to change their
administrative measures regarding the issue, renewal, and validity of the Nansen passport. For
instance, one of the provisions of Article 3 noted that the Contracting Governments reserved the
right to limit the period during which the refugee may had wanted to seek refuge again.
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Similarly, the last point of Article 4 noted that while the concerned Governments were
technically not allowed to send refugees back to the Reich unless they had been warned and
refused to make arrangements to immigrate to another nation, it also gave contracting states the
ability to cancel or withdraw identity certificates.161
Finally, Article 12 of the Final Clauses, which pertained only to League and non-Member
states that possessed colonies, protectorates, or any other overseas territory, outlined that any
government accepting the arrangement was not assuming any obligation in respect to any of its
mandated abroad territories. Even though it included a clause that allowed any government to
apply the acceptance of this new travel document to any of their territories it wished to apply,
there was another clause that allowed signatory states to limit where the Nansen passport could
be used. In other words, mandated territories of the signatory states were not obligated to
authorize the usage of the Nansen passport for refugee access if the motherland decided to
extend the Nansen passport for Saar refugees.162 Such clauses resemble the legal concerns raised
by the Indian government on agreeing to the adoption of the Nansen passport in being extended
to the Saar refugees earlier in 1936 and some of the European governments decisions in 1935 to
not authorize the settlement of refugees within their colonial possessions when asked by the
League Council to allow Russian, Armenian, and other refugees eligible for the Nansen
passport.163 These lenient guidelines on what signatory states were allowed to do with the Nansen
passport did not create a strong enough sense of urgency among the League in making sure the
Saar refugees were gaining access to transnational borders and receiving the means of assistance
they needed to survive.
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To make matters worse for the League, it appeared bringing the Nansen Office and the
High Commission under its direct authority was leading to some serious fiscal difficulties. With
the Nansen Office and High Commission part of the League organization, the League needed to
make sure that it had enough funding for both organizations so that they could afford resources
required for international refugee assistance. With the Nansen Office overseeing the Saar
refugees along with the numerous refugee groups in Eastern Europe, donations were highly
needed if the League was going to provide assistance to refugees of the Saar. The Governing
Body of the Nansen Office estimated that in 1937 1,922 refugees had been assisted by the Office
through the expense of just 61,000 Swiss francs.164 The Office emphasized that these small
contributions were used to pay for the cost of regularizing naturalization papers, travel expenses,
medical treatment, training for new job professions, purchase of clothing, and other means of
assistance, and called for an extension of such assistance so that the refugees could become more
skilled workers and thus become self-supporting.165
In the context of the Saar refugee problem, the seventeenth Assembly of the League had
voted a credit of 200,000 Swiss francs for the settlement of Saar refugees in South America
through the arrangement concluded with the Paraguayan government.166 This contribution would
cover transport costs from a European port to Asunción, the purchase of twelve hectares of land
for each family, the construction of a small housing project, the boring of a well, a small supply
of poultry, and house maintenance for one year.167 Despite the vote in authorizing 200,000 Swiss
francs to be used towards the evacuation, resettlement, and employment efforts towards the Saar
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refugees, the League only provided 102,900 Swiss francs, and approximately 70,875 of that
credit went towards the evacuation to Paraguay alone.168 The Office also noted that while it was
appreciative of League’s direct contributions, it was needing more funds to cover the Saar
refugee budget. It explained that the League’s proposed contributions of 234,153 Swiss francs
for the years 1937 and 1938 would leave another 13,072 francs for work in Syria and another
20,000 for the Saar, as 169,197 Swiss francs was already given to the Office for 1937 alone.169
While the Supervisory Commission of the League had raised the question of
supplementary credit to the League Assembly on May 7, 1937, the Office concluded that even
with the inclusion of supplementary credit, the budget of the Nansen Office for 1938 would be
smaller than that of the previous year. Inevitably, the Assembly would come to the conclusion
that the Nansen Office could only afford a partial resolution to the Nansen refugee problem due
to an insufficiency of available resources. The League Council would then adopt President
Hansson’s suggestion that the best alternative would be for the states hosting Nansendocumented refugees would become the refugees’ caretakers.170 Due to these limits on what the
Nansen Office could do to help Nansen-documented refugees, the Council’s resolution also
included the Nansen Office and High Commission’s liquidation date to be set for December 31st,
1938.
Before this call for the liquidation of both refugee organizations, both the League and
Malcolm were making efforts to help the refugees that would not be able to stay in the caretaking
states. On February 10, 1938, the League would convene again in Geneva to adopt an
international convention for refugees coming from Germany. Keeping the resolution of the
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eighteenth Assembly, which recognized the transfer of sovereignty between the French and
German governments of the Saar, and the 1936 provisional arrangement on creating a statute for
German refugees in consideration, the League intended to establish conditions that would make
it more practical for refugees to be “absorbed” within the League and non-League member
states. This convention concerning the status of German refugees included creating a separate
identity certificate that refugees from Germany would be able to use to settle in any country that
refugees were able to remain. Within such agreement, there were some promising aspects that
illustrated the League had some consideration for the ethical necessities in approaching the
refugee crisis. For instance, Article 8 in the section on the legal standing or refugees expressed
that refugees within the territories they were allowed to take shelter and receive aid were to be
entitled to the same rights and privileges as those of nationals.171 This call for considering the
status of refugees equal to that of national citizens shows that League officials were attempting
to shift the philosophical interpretation of refugee’s place in the international community.
In addition, in his section on the welfare and relief for refugees, Article 11 outlined that
refugees, whether they were unemployed, disabled, women that were either pregnant or in
childbed, were to receive the most favorable relief and assistance in accordance with national
law.172 This was a moment in the League’s diplomatic history that saw Western bureaucrats
adopting provisions that would provide individuals humanitarian aid of a wide range of
demographics.
While the League’s agreement started to highlight humanitarian implications of the
refugee crisis, there were some parts made within the arrangement that overturned some
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provisions from a previous agreement. For example, Article 9 of the 1938 Convention
concerning Refugees from Germany was meant to reproduce the Article 7 of October 1933
Convention, which overturned any measures that restricted refugees access to the national labor
market of a care-taking state. However, it did not reproduce the final condition of the 1933
agreement, which guaranteed refugees means of providing for themselves if they were an excombatant of the First World War.173 This convention was a response to the 1933 Law for
Restoration of the Professional Civil Service, which included a clause that exempted Jews and
other political opponents of civil service positions if they were veterans of the Great War.174
Why League bureaucrats no longer guaranteed refugees of veteran status employment
opportunities is not clear. However, this clause does illustrate a shift in the League’s position
regarding the protection of refugees from Germany, which shows they no longer considered
former participants of the war as those that could have the same exceptions in seeking
employment like civilians. As the year 1938 progressed, so did Hitler’s plans for expansion.
What will be witnessed now is how the reunification of Austria and Germany further
complicated the League’s progress in addressing the issue of German refugees, especially going
forward with their new agreement concerning the status of refugees from Nazi-held Germany.

The Third Reich Expands – The Refugee Crisis Escalates
As predicted by McDonald, the conditions of refugee treatment in Nazi Germany only
intensified. But the intensity of the refugee situation would not only escalate within the mainland
Reich. With the Führer wanting to expand Germany’s borders, refugee mistreatment in Europe
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became a bigger issue for the League. On March 12th, 1938, troops of the German Eighth Army
rolled through the Austrian borders, thus signaling the beginning of Hitler’s first major imperial
aspiration – the reunification of Austria and Germany.175 While Anschluss was viewed positively
by its sympathizers, the reunion of the German Reich and Austria would be an extension of the
Nazi’s brutal terror on Jewish communities outside of the German homeland. Within the first
days of reunification, 500 Jewish leaders were arrested. Jewish businesses, newspaper
publications, and offices were pillaged. Jews were condemned from their living spaces and
expelled from professional and cultural fields like universities and art museums.176 Any Jew that
had more than $2,000 of currency value were not only forced to register their personal properties
to the Nazi regime, but were subject to have their property confiscated by the regime.177
Due to the political circumstances of Anschluss, there were significant impacts on the
composition of Austria’s Jewish community. The mortality rate among Jews in Vienna went
from six to nearly fifty per day as a result of a number of factors such as starvation, physical
assaults, and suicides. The approximately 30,000 individuals who managed to avoid the social
horrors of Nazified annexation requested travel visas before the American consulate, with
another 10,000 wanting to migrate to Australia.178 Since the process for these refugees to leave
Austria started more slowly than the Nazis had expected, they began to develop new ways in
expelling their targets. For example, there was a case in early April 1938, when fifty-one Jews in
the Burgenland were kicked out of their homes, forced to board an unsanitary barge, and were
left stranded in the Danube River (or no man’s land) near the Hungarian coast without food,
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money, and adequate clothing. These Jewish refugees turned to the neighboring countries of
Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary for assistance, but all denied them access.179
Emoldened by the lack of outcry from the League and no willingness to help the stranded
Jewish refugees from the neighboring states of Anschluss, the Nazis would continue their
institutional terror through the rest of 1938, especially after the infamous Munich Pact. Under the
terms of the agreement, France and Britain granted Germany permission to annex the
Sudetenland with the rest of the Nazi Reich. Shortly after the pact that relinquished
Czechoslovakian sovereignty from the Sudetenland region, there were a series of Jewish
mistreatment cases taking place in areas that were classified as “no man’s land”, or areas where
lines of sovereignty were either difficult or unable to be drawn. In September, more than 20,000
Jews were expelled from the Sudetenland. Then, in late October, around 18,000 Polish Jews
residing in Germany were rounded up in the middle of the night, driven to swampy areas
bordering Poland, and were instructed them to run while SS guards were shooting at them. At
this point of the Nazi program, the Nazis sought to use their “living space” for German
colonization and to do so they needed to displace “unwanted” Jews. This is when the Nazis
began to use the terrain near their newly acquired territory as dumping areas for unwanted
peoples. Jews were forced to rest in stables or along the roads of Slovakian cities, and had to
sleep on straw while facing a deadly European cold front. Due to such conditions, many
contracted and eventually died of certain illnesses such as typhus and typhoid. The most intense
episodes of Jewish mistreatment occurred in Nitra, Zilina, Michalovce, and Prestany.180
The atrocities committed in Austria and the Sudetenland were precisely reflecting what
McDonald had expected in 1935 – an escalation of the refugee question if the League would not

179
180

Friedman, No Haven, 40.
Friedman, No Haven, 40-41.

80
readjust themselves in how they were approaching the issue. Such turn of events made League
officials reconsider their institutional structure and methodologies in helping the numerous
refugee groups under the supervision of both the Nansen Office and High Commission for
German Refugees. After the annexation of Austria and the Sudetenland, both Malcolm and
League Secretary-General Drummond asked the individual League states to extend the
provisions of the Convention in February 1938 to the refugees that formerly constituted Austria
and Sudetenland. As a result, League members would adopt a statute that included refugees from
both regions to be included in the convention that sought to protect refugees from Germany.181
However, with the liquidation of the Nansen institution marked for the end of 1938, states
that had pledged to provide assistance for both Nansen and German refugees had to consider the
absorption of both refugee groups. In its report in drawing a solution for refugee relief on May
14, 1938, the League Council Committee calculated that there would be a combined total of
about 750,000 refugees between both organizations that need to be under consideration for
assistance.182 Of those 750,000 refugees, 150,000 were refugees that had left German territory,
with close to 120,000 having already reached the nations they were wanting to settle
permanently. It was further concluded by the League Council Committee that both refugee
categories would be able to develop solutions within “a limited time.” These developments
persuaded the League Assembly at its eighteenth ordinary session to discontinue the services of
the Office of the High Commissioner for German Refugees, which also would be set for the end
of 1938.183 The report from the Council provides a rather confusing interpretation on the refugee
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crisis. In one retrospect, League officials believed that the German refugee issue was under the
process of being resolved. However, it is peculiar that the Council was unable to provide the
specifics on when the German refugee issue could had been resolved indefinitely. The vague
response to when the question of refugees coming from German territory suggests that when the
Nazis were accumulating more territory the League was not fully sure of themselves when they
could reach a solution that would help those fleeing from the annexed territories. Furthermore, it
can be suggested that at this point of European diplomacy, the League knew that the refugee
crisis regarding the Nazis’ violations of human rights was evolving from bad to worse.184
That said, the League’s story on refugee relief was far from over as the League
Committee suggested that the Council should provide instructions for the Secretary-General,
Drummond, to formulate a detailed plan for providing global assistance to refugees after
consulting with both Johnson and Malcolm. It was decided between the three agents, that the
functions of Johnson’s Nansen Office and Malcolm’s Commission would be merged into one
organization under the League’s authority, thus placing refugees from Germany, the Saar,
Armenian, and Russian refugees under the care of a single governing body.185 When national
governments responded to the League Committee’s proposal in moving forward to outline a new
plan for refugee rescue, those that responded showed overall optimism. There were, however,
some concerns raised by individual League states before the League proceeded to create a new
bureaucratic body that would oversee refugee difficulties. The response from the United
Kingdom government expressed optimism in moving forward with the merger of the High
Commission and Nansen Office responsibilities. It did, though, propose that the budget for this
new organization should not exceed the total of the existing budgets of both the Nansen Office
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and High Commission for Refugees.186 Such a proposal had set fiscal expectations that would
limit the League expense and ability in providing assistance to all refugee groups that the League
would become responsible for.
Furthermore, the Greek government was one of the few respondents that did not approve
the Committee’s consideration of absorbing all refugee groups into care-taking nations. It stated
that the 1,300,000 national refugees that had already been absorbed had become “a very heavy
burden on the country.”187 Officials expressed the concern that Greece did not have enough
economic resources to provide assistance to those they had already authorized refuge, and that
absorbing Nansen refugees would only exacerbate their abilities in providing fiscal relief to
refugees. It was also reported that the care-taking nations of France, Syria, and Bulgaria were
also experiencing difficulties in absorbing the 120,000 Armenian refugees since they had already
been providing so much care to those of Russian decent.188
These financial expectations on the new bureaucratic organization that would oversee
issues of all refugee classes and the rising concerns of individual states providing refugee care
themselves suggests that by 1938 it was becoming more difficult for the League in coming up
with solutions that would ensure all refugees were receiving the adequate means of assistance. If
the League itself was still dealing with a limited budget to help refugees, and if individual
League states were unable to provide social services and economic benefits to individuals that no
longer had political protection, this gave refugees, especially Jews wanting to escape Nazi
persecution, very few options to migrate to.
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What the League decided to do was go through the Council’s proposals to create a single
refugee organization known as the League High Commission for Refugees. This institution
would provide direct assistance to all the refugee classes that were under the supervision of both
the Nansen Office and High Commission for German refugees. While the League successfully
was able to create an institution that would be under League authority, it unfortunately ran into
funding issues. With complaints regarding the fiscal difficulties faced by both the League and its
individual members, the League could only afford a limited annual budget of 194,500 Swiss
francs for the new High Commission’s operations for 1939.189 Even though Drummond
suggested to the Supervisory Commission that it should approve another 20,000 Swiss francs to
be added to the 1939 budget for the High Commission, such additions would not be able to
match the yearly budgets of the two previous refugee institutions, which both averaged 378,487
Swiss francs.190 With the League dealing with a smaller annual budget to provide resources for
refugees, this made it even more difficult for the League to afford resources that refugees
escaping from the Reich needed.

The Intergovernmental Committee: Intersection or Disjunction with the League?
While the League was continuing to oversee Europe’s massive refugee situation, the American
government, especially Roosevelt, began taking notice and interest on the League’s handling of
European refugee assistance. According to Friedman’s studies, Roosevelt was inspired by the
League’s attentiveness in attempting to approach the question of refugees. He was also
convinced that the League and its operatives were unable to resolve the refugee problem. This
led to Roosevelt and Secretary of State Cordell Hull’s invitation to nations across the globe to an
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international conference concerning the status of refugees, otherwise known as the Evian
Conference.191 One day later, March 24, 1938, Hull released a long statement that not only
expressed American interest in the refugee issue but also declared that the government of
America wanted to help lead towards a quick solution with other institutions that were trying to
resolve the refugee crisis.192 Hull’s statement received striking interest from League officials.
This inspired officials at the Evian Conference to develop hard principles related to the handling
of the refugee problem that American officials such as Roosevelt and Hull were enthusiastic
about.
Some of the most influential principles established at the Evian Conference included:
1) all groups of refugees would not be specifically distinguished from one another;
2) no work of the Intergovernmental Committee would intervene with the activities of
existing organizations conducting refugee aid efforts; and
3) no nation was not required to make changes to their current immigration regulations in
order to accommodate refugees.193
Some of these principles outlined differed from the ways the League had been
approaching refugee assistance before 1938. For instance, the League had been identifying
different refugee classes, and were approaching each case of refugee mistreatment separately as
opposed to a universal scale. In addition, many of the provisions the League was encouraging its
members to adopt when it came to the question of absorption never specified that League
members were not required to amend their immigration systems. This meant that it may had been
necessary for League states to make additional measures in the ways they regulated immigration
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if they wanted to provide refugees hospitality. The principles nevertheless showed that this
American-led committee began to create a new level of urgency, leadership, and cooperation
among Western diplomats in addressing the humanitarian struggles of Europe’s refugee crisis.
But to what extent was there cooperative measures in conducting refugee rescue between both
institutions?
In simplest terms, there was little cooperation or contact between the League and the
Intergovernmental Committee when it came to tackling the issue of refugees jointly during the
late interwar period. One of the earliest works conducted by the Intergovernmental Committee
independently on refugee policy involved confronting the German government of its inhumane
treatment of those they labeled as “enemies of the state”. Intergovernmental officials believed
that they could resolve the refugee problem on their own through diplomacy. Unfortunately, they
would find out what the League had already knew, that it would be impossible to reach a
diplomatic solution involving the German Nazi government. On October 13, 1938, George
Rublee, an official from the Department of State, reported to the Intergovernmental Committee’s
chairman Myron C. Taylor that President Roosevelt’s-proposed approach in confronting the
German government for its atrocities against Jewish and non-German refugees only resulted in
the Third Reich’s reluctance in meeting with Intergovernmental officials.194 During dinner for the
American Committee meeting in London, American Ambassador to Britain Joseph Kennedy
managed to speak with German Ambassador Joachim von Ribbentrop asking if they could talk
about the numbers of individuals that were experiencing discriminatory hardship under Nazi
leadership. Ribbentrop stated that Hitler was not ready to discuss the matter.195 In his
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Intergovernmental Committee report to Taylor on November 7, Rublee reported back that he was
unable to formally meet with German officials on the matter of refugees as Ribbentrop opposed
any further discussions on the matter of refugees.196 While he did acknowledge that the Foreign
Office reported that Goering would be in England between November 20th and mid-December,
there did not appear to be any incentive among Rublee to address the refugee issue to the leader
of the Luftwaffe.197 It was concluded by Rublee that the unwillingness from Nazi officials to
participate in talks over the refugee problem meant that any appeal to Hitler would produce
ineffective results.
Furthermore, when the League and Intergovernmental Committee came in contact with
one another when trying to sort out the Sudetenland Situation, they failed to produce a
cooperative resolution. While Rublee happily accompanied Malcolm to fly to Prague to discuss
the question of German annexation of Sudeten territory in relation to the issue of the Czech
refugee situation, he did not find Malcolm’s performance as High Commissioner impressive. In
his letter to George L. Warren, President of the Intergovernmental Advisory Committee on
Political Refugees, on his observations in Malcolm’s efforts in Prague, Rublee stated that
Malcolm was able to do very little in changing the detrimental consequences of the
Sudetenland.198 He also stated that the League had criticized Malcolm for attending the Prague
negotiations since the League had not recognized the transfer of Sudeten areas to Germany.199
Rublee’s negative views towards Malcolm taking a vital charge in the issue of the Sudetenland
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refugee crisis illustrates that both the League and the Intergovernmental Committee did not see
the value in Malcolm trying to resolve the humanitarian difficulties of the Czech refugees.
In addition to the Intergovernmental Committee’s poor impression of Malcolm heading
the High Commission Office, the American-led organization expressed having difficulties with
the British government entirely. Rublee mentioned discussion over a so-called “Transfer Plan”
that did not meet British expectations of such a plan. For instance, when Lord Winterton
responded to the Intergovernmental Committee’s memorandum on a plan to transfer the Sudeten
refugees over to South America, Rublee wrote that the British government proposed to
distinguish between Jewish and other involuntary emigrants; a revision in which the American
government was trying to avoid from being adopted.200 Rublee found the proposal to be very
objectionable, for he saw such revisions would provide the British a tendency to dictate which
refugees would be accepted within their homeland and which be allowed access to their
colonies.201 Furthermore, Rublee insisted that if other countries such as those in South America
learned that Britain was restricting refugees from entering their homeland, it might jeopardize the
plan for transferring refugees. For instance, he had discussed with Heilo Lobo, a Brazilian
diplomat, that if Jews were to be admitted to Brazil and other South American countries they
should not point out that the majority of refugees were Jewish since this would give an incentive
among the pro anti-Semitic governments to refuse such refugees entry.202 Even with the
American government taking charge in 1938, the legal matter of refugees was still within the
arena of global politics. While Rublee’s perception on League and British government activities
on refugees suggests that American officials were trying to put forward recommendations that
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individuals such as McDonald would have appreciated, the Intergovernmental Committee found
itself hitting a dead-end trying to come up with a resolution for refugees. What can also be
determined from the records is that cooperation was very low between the two organizations
during the late interwar period.
At the turn of 1939, the League would begin the new year with what League officials
would hope to be a fresh start in tackling refugee crisis. With the Nansen Office and High
Commission for Refugees from Germany terminated, Sir Herbert Emerson would begin his
appointed position as the League of Nation’s High Commissioner for Refugees, thus assuming
responsibility of all refugee classes that was once was overseen by the two previous
institutions.203 The League’s first order of business was to develop policies that concerned the
status of refugees from the Sudetenland. At the League’s Council meeting in January, the
Council extended the powers of the High Commissioner to include the refugees from the
Sudetenland in the context of refugee protection.204
1939 was not only a year that witnessed the League’s extension in its responsibilities
towards regarding refugees, but it was also a year in which the League tried to reflect and
reassess where there were at in terms of their progress as a global organization in providing
international assistance to refugees. Political Scientist Louise Holborn noted how the League had
handicapped itself in their work for refugees and had failed to treat refugee works in the context
of humanitarianism as opposed through a legal context.205 Along with this reconsideration on
how the League approached refugee works, it initially appeared that the League and the
Intergovernmental Committee began to reevaluate their relations after the unfortunate turn of
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events between Malcolm, the League, and the Committee regarding the Sudetenland dilemma.
On February 16, 1939, Winterton wrote, on behalf of the American-led Committee, to Emerson
that after its February 14th meeting, the Intergovernmental Committee urged closer co-operation
between the Committee and the League of Nations High Commissioner in handling Europe’s
refugee crisis.206 One day later, Emerson expressed gratitude for the Committee’s concerns in its
relations with the League, and accepted Winterton’s invitation to conduct complementary
refugee policy.207 With this hopeful reassurance in working jointly, at least in a theoretical sense,
it looked like both organizations were wanting to take 1939 as a fresh start in promoting and
protecting the lives of the thousands of refugees impacted by Nazi expansion. However, this new
beginning to provide more effective means of direct assistance would be interrupted with the
world’s most catastrophic test yet…the outbreak of the Second World War.
At first, it appeared that the large-scale conflict brought a major interruption in the
discussion on refugee works for League officials. League bureaucrats struggled to propose a plan
for assisting those that were devastated by the increasing struggles of the conflict. In fact, after
February of 1939, there appears to be no more discussion among League officials on how they
could improve their system in providing direct assistance to refugees within their official journal,
especially when Nazi Germany fired the first shots in Europe against League member Poland in
September 1939. The outbreak of another world war became the League’s biggest global
concern, as they viewed their new serious obligation was trying to punish Germany for its act of
aggression against Poland.208
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However, as the war progressed, a number of League reports submitted by then-acting
Secretary-General Drummond suggests that the refugee issue remained foremost in the minds of
League officials. As the refugee crisis intensified due to the prolongation of the war in Europe,
Drummond’s reports on the League’s activities during the war indicates that the League started
to understand the implications of Europe’s mass refugee problem. In an annual League report for
1941-1942, Emerson acknowledged that once the war came to an end, there would be many
foreign refugees wanting to return to their homelands. While he stated that many of the refugees
that were imprisoned in concentration camps, deported for labor, or those that emigrated to
escape from war-zones would be able to make such arrangements either independently or by
concerned governments, Emerson believes that such arrangements would not be sufficient
enough, as he recalled that it took Dr. Nansen nearly two years to provide living means to nearly
half-a-million of refugees in Europe and Asia.209 This criticism claims to highlight that Emerson
not only predicted the displaced persons’ dilemma that would emerge after the World War II’s
conclusion, but he knew that immediate intergovernmental action would be required to help
those impacted by the war, thus providing a fundamental basis for post-war international politics
in approaching the refugee crisis.
At the same time, however, Emerson was concerned about the status of national citizens
within impoverished European states. He believed that emphasizing too much focus on providing
aid to foreign refugees could possibly lead to another displacement crisis of individuals that
already were under the protection of a national government, especially in areas where regime
changes preferred the return of immigrants as opposed to providing assistance for nationals.
Considering the League’s experience in approaching the refugee problem for the previous twenty
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years, Emerson believed that providing relief for individuals impacted by the war would involve
more than solely relying on the financial contributions of private organizations, nor did he expect
for certain emigration countries to continue to absorb refugees within their territorial spaces.210
Emerson’s claims demonstrate that he understood the League’s methodological weaknesses that
were preventing itself from providing direct assistance to a vast range of refugee classes. Did this
mean that Emerson’s criticisms would lead to developments that the League would be able to fix
the refugee crisis that started in Germany and expanded across Europe?
Under Emerson’s leadership of its High Commission for Refugees, the League was trying
to reestablish itself as a global agency to provide direct assistance to refugees. The new High
Commission for refugees was starting to bring back an institutional personality that it had been
lacking since McDonald’s departure of the High Commissioner for German Refugees in 1935.
But this does not mean that the League was tackling the refugee problem as if it was the only
refugee assistance institution. During the war, the League was starting to provide statistics to
other agencies, such as the Intergovernmental Committee, and individual national governments
that had the capability, if not the possibility, of providing hospitality and financial assistance to
refugees wanting to escape a war-phased Europe.
Starting in 1942, the League would continue to provide statistics on the number of
refugees that were fleeing to countries that declared neutrality from the conflict, particularly
Switzerland and Spain. Drummond’s report on Emerson’s studies showed that at the beginning
of 1942 there were about 6,000 German and Austrian refugees that were able to find asylum
prior to the war’s outbreak. Through the Emigration Office of the Swiss Federal Police, it was
estimated that 2,000 of them were able to be resettled in oversea countries. Unfortunately, it was

210

LN, Work of the League 1941-1942, 67.

92
also estimated that about 15,000 individuals were able to successfully take refuge in Switzerland
after “clandestinely” crossing the border.211 The Swiss state also was running low in providing
funds for re-emigration. Similarly, Spain had received around 15,000 refugees by the autumn of
1942. But it acquired a rather diverse number of refugees, as many were of Polish, Czech,
Yugoslavian, and formerly Russian decent that were unable to depart from Spain.212 The
Secretary-General’s report indicates that Emerson saw the value of neutral-declared states in
Europe, for Emerson believed that such states could have been used as sanctuary areas where
refugees could obtain documentation to migrate and gain forms of assistance either directly from
the care-giving state or a refugee agency. However, it was claimed that Emerson realized that the
WWII-neutral countries alone could not afford to provide adequate resources to the growing
number of refugees.
After raising this urgent problem to the American and British governments, the United
States suggested that it should help support the neutral countries in their abilities to house
refugees until they could be repatriated once the war ended through the administrative powers of
a new intergovernmental body. These proposals were then sent and approved by the Executive
Committee of the Intergovernmental Refugees Committee. While there were no arrangements
made to help those that were stranded in Spain, such proposals did pave the way towards a
transfer scheme negotiated between the British Treasury and the American Federal Government
that would provide remittances to persons living in the United Kingdom that were close relatives
to those that were unable to leave Switzerland, Sweden, unoccupied France and the Iberian
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Peninsula.213 These diplomatic transitions suggests that because of his studies as the League’s
High Commissioner, Emerson was able to establish strong communication lines between the
Intergovernmental Committee, individual national states, and the League in responding to urgent
developments of the refugee crisis.
Not only were Emerson’s works from the High Commission claimed to have created
greater cooperation between the League and the Intergovernmental Committee during the war,
but they helped gain the support of other organs that would pledge in providing support for
refugees. Drummond reported in 1943 that a governmental character had emerged between the
League High Commission, the Intergovernmental Committee, the United Nations Relief and
Rehabilitation Administration, and the War Refugee Board, which pledged that all the following
intergovernmental agencies would communicate with one another to work on solutions for
refugee assistance.214 Emerson received credit for his consistent acknowledgement of the
pressing concerns of refugees in Europe during the war because his efforts were claimed to have
helped raise the importance of taking intergovernmental action. This mobilization within the
League and other intergovernmental agencies close to the League not only resulted in a greater
conscience about the wartime struggles of refugees, but Drummond went on to say that it led to a
number of diplomatic developments that would ensure refugees were being provided the services
they needed in order to escape a war-devastated Europe both during the conflict and its
immediate post-war period.
What also should be noted about Drummond’s 1943 report on the League’s activities is
its heavy detail about its connections with the Intergovernmental Committee. In particular, he
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discussed the adoption of recommendations that reorganized the Intergovernmental Committee.
In London on August 4th, 1943, the Committee adopted a number of important recommendations
in connection to its role in refugee work. Membership to the Committee was enlarged due to the
decision to enlarge its responsibility to respond to the wars danger it caused on both the lives and
civil liberties of refugees. The adoption of this recommendation further guaranteed the
Intergovernmental Committee being the chief organ tasked with resolving the refugee crisis; the
same institution that Emerson was instructed to maintain relations with by the League Assembly
of 1938. The most important decision adopted by the Committee related to the financing of
refugee assistance, which involved working with the governments of the United Kingdom and
America and inviting other governments to help afford the transportation and living expenses for
refugees and gain access to proper travel documentation.215 Though Drummond added in his
report that such contributions were to be added to the donations made by private institutions, it
can be suggested that Intergovernmental Committee officials were aware that the contributions
from private organizations would not enough to cover the numerous expenses involved with
providing refugee aid.
In the end, these reports provide a number of explanations about the League’s wartime
refugee policies. The first discovery is that Emerson was a well-known and well-endorsed
individual within the League, as the Secretary-General’s reports appear to give Emerson an
enormous amount of credit as to how the League was reaffirming itself as a refugee relief
administration. But the most important aspect learned from these records is if we reference the
words of the League Secretary-General it is true to say that the League was no longer the sole
administrator of the great refugee problem, and that the Intergovernmental Committee became
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the chief political body tasked with solving it. At the same time, however, it does not necessarily
mean that the League completely ended its operations regarding refugee protection. It instead
served a secondary role in the refugee problem by the course of the war, which was to provide
intelligence to the Intergovernmental Committee and nations concerned about the refugee
situation on the number of refugees that had been taken refuge and how many refugees were left
that still needed care across Europe. Such reports on the work of Emerson and its connection to
the global bureaucratic developments is not entirely clear and could possibly be a complete
exaggeration. Nevertheless, they claim that the League High Commission still served as a
functional body that was involved in addressing the refugee crisis during the war.
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Conclusion
Despite the disappointing performance from the League before Europe’s second major
conflict, the League’s value on refugee policy should not be overlooked, but not necessarily
overly praised. This piece agrees with Burgess’ claim that by the time the American-promoted
Intergovernmental Committee was established, it would become a major agency that would
oversee the issue of refugees victimized by peacetime and wartime Nazism. It is thus also true to
say that the League unfortunately failed to maintain itself as a champion, if not an agency that
had the competence in ensuring the protection of all refugees. But what this thesis also brings to
light are the ways in which the League continued to function after the ICR emerged in 1938.
During the 1920s, the League was known for its successful interwar refugee policy under
the admired Nansen, who was able to provide travel documentation and direct aid to hundreds of
thousands of Russian and Armenian refugees. After his unfortunate death, the League would
establish the Nansen Office to hopefully continue the successful refugee works that had been
conducted under the League’s first High Commissioner.216 However, the rise of the Nazis in
Germany created a new kind of refugee issue—one involving a League member. Due to this
concerning development within the League, it was forced to create an autonomous Commission
that would deal with the German refugee crisis.217 While the League had full confidence that
American diplomat McDonald would be able to come up with a solution, the High Commission
for German Refugees was unfortunately under-resourced when it was first created. It was
dependent on private organizations for funding, which could not provide enough finances to
cover all migration expenses. With Germany withdrawing from the League in October 1933, and
McDonald resigning his post as High Commissioner for refugees from Germany at the end of
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1935, the League attempted to change its approach towards the German refugee crisis. With Sir
Malcolm taking McDonald’s place as the overseer of the refugee problem, the League placed the
High Commission under its thumb, which enabled the Commission to receive finances and
advice in addressing the refugee crisis caused by the German Nazi government.218
Despite its institutional reorganization, the League not only continued to run into fiscal
difficulties just like when the Commission was not a direct League agency. Furthermore, when it
was communicating with states that were concerned about the status of refugees as the German
refugee crisis escalated, both the High Commission and Nansen Office learned that there was
only so much space and resources that individual care-giving nations were willing to afford to
provide shelter and fiscal responsibilities. To make issues worse, with the Nazi regime
expanding its borders, the number of people that the League would be responsible for would
continue to substantially increase as more and more people were trying to escape the horrors of
systemic Nazism and social anti-Semitism. It was then decided by the League Council to
officially liquidate both offices by the end of 1938 and bring all refugee classes under the
responsibility of one High Commission. At the same time, the US government became interested
in the League’s refugee policies and established its own global organization known as the
Intergovernmental Committee for Refugees. The ICR would become the chief organ that was
responsible for formulating solutions to the refugee problem that worsened under the League’s
watch.
However, the above evidence claims that under Emerson’s leadership as the new League
High Commissioner for Refugees, the League still served as a functional international refugee
relief agency. They also suggest that the League was trying to improve or reposition its value
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towards resolving the refugee issue. Drummond ’reflected that the war experience reminded
League officials that the legal protection of refugees was a vital purpose as to why the League
was formed in the first place. Such reminders as to why the League was established can possibly
help us understand as to what prompted the High Commission’s success in establishing a civil
documents service which enabled refugees to acquire documentation required for re-emigrating
overseas or acts of civil life.219
Drummond also claimed that Emerson had stated that the war made many within the
League circle believe that the need and scope for refugee protection would not only need to be
greater than in previous years of the League agency but believed that it should remain as a
significant responsibility of any international refugee authority.220 What would transpire shortly
after World War II would be the rise of other global agencies that sought to address and resolve
postwar refugee problems. Perhaps the most important institution that would rise after 1945 was
the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration (ICEM). In the early 1950s, many
nations in Western Europe were becoming overpopulated due to a combination of the numerous
displaced individuals that had migrated from Eastern Europe and its high birth rates.221 Such
population increases were starting to put serious weight on the plans for Europe’s economic
recovery, as many individuals were unemployed, separated from their families, and had no
access to living necessities. To address issues related to Europe’s surplus in population and
migration, the US Congress passed a Mutual Security Act, as well as an appropriations act that
allocated $10 million to support what would eventually become as the ICEM.222 This operational
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organization would receive strong financial support from the United States; the institution would
also serve as a tool that enabled states to manage and structure migration flows. Written in
Article 1.2 of its Constitution, the ICEM pledged that it would:
“…make arrangements for the transport of migrants, for whom existing facilities
were inadequate and who could not otherwise be moved, from European countries
having surplus populations to countries overseas which offered opportunities for
orderly immigration [and]…to promote the increase of the volume of migration
from Europe by providing…services in the processing, reception, first placement
and settlement of migrants which other international institutions are not in a
position to supply.”223
The emphasis on transportation illustrates that the ICEM understood that when
supporting migration efforts, they needed to take into consideration that there were adequate
resources for refugee relief, thus creating a balance between the resources a state could provide
and its inhabitants that were living and seeking refuge in. This is a prime example on the
evolution of intergovernmental refugee settlement works, for such efforts are not only reflections
of what the League was trying to accomplish, but also the ICEM appeared to have learned from
the limitations of League refugee policy in regard to fiscal and settlement shortages.
Finally, it can be said that the League’s focus on refugee issues contributed to the U.S.
government becoming a key player in international politics. Under President Harry Truman, the
United States became a formal member and a driving force within the organization that would
replace the League as the main global political body that would promote international
cooperation – the United Nations (UN). The United States joining the UN demonstrated the
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country had come out of its shell of isolationism and realized what McDonald had tried to get
across through the minds of American officials nearly a decade ago, which was that America had
a significant role in not just the course of global affairs, but also in the promotion of
humanitarianism, an ideal that sprouted from the heavily focused refugee works of the League.
After analyzing the dense evolution of the League’s administrative history dealing with
refugees, there are a couple conclusions that can be drawn from this thesis. This study is not by
any means defending the notion that the League was a flawless, successful institution on refugee
assistance. It is instead describing a new perspective on the legacy of the League. There is a
more detailed analysis on the League’s activities from its birth in 1919 up to 1935 when
McDonald stepped down as the High Commissioner tasked with settling the question of German
refugees. This thesis provides a better understanding on the League’s diplomatic history in the
context of the German refugee crisis after 1935 and up towards the end of World War II. When
comparing the governmental experiences of the League from the 1920s to those of the second
half of the interwar period and during the outbreak of the Second World War, the League had
always raised the question of refugee mistreatment and were trying to develop policies that
would lessen or resolve the difficulties refugees experienced due to the rise and expansion of
Nazism. What this thesis also accomplishes is reminding scholars the contrasting circumstances
that were involved during each decade of the League’s existence and how they made it not only
different, but more complicated for the League in fulfilling its obligations towards refugee
protection. These complications in turn help us understand the limits on what the League could
or were willing to do when grappling refugee problems.
While there were ways that limited the League’s ability to coordinate refugee policy
during the interwar and World War II eras, it is true to say that it paved the way for the ICR to
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charge in dealing with the refugee question, but the League did not halt its operations as a
refugee network. The League was supposedly communicating with other organizations, namely
the ICR, and was providing information and potential ideas on how refugee issues can be dealt
with. While collaboration did not exist during the late interwar period, cooperation appeared to
improve during the League’s tenure as a secondary agent when other institutions joined the
coalition to improve the lives of refugees.
One last conclusion that can be taken away from this study on the League’s diplomatic
history dealing with refugee works is that by the early 1930s since the League was short on
resources, it relied on diplomatic personalities to get its missions accomplished. That explains
why there was so much admiration and constant referencing of an individual like Nansen, who
dealt with refugee questions very well, when the League created the institutions that would
emerge after his death. When understanding the evolution of the League’s progress on refugee
problems, this piece reveals that it was more about creating individual personalities as opposed
to self-sustaining institutions. The League believed that they had to rely on interpersonal
relations as opposed to a number of agents that had the capacity to meet the League’s
expectations and hopes. McDonald was put in charge of the High Commission for German
Refugees not only because of his political expertise, but for his interpersonal connections. While
Malcolm was unable to match the individual qualities as his predecessor, the League had
confidence that Emerson could fill in the shoes of a great refugee commissioner like Nansen.
Emerson’s migration to the ICR was emblematic for the League because not only was another
international institution interested in his services, but it reveals what the League was struggling
to do all along, which was to find someone with the right personality to solve the refugee crisis.
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